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The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and
Publicly Funded Speech
The abortion debate has entered every level of discourse, from per-
sonal conversation to political speeches, in the nineteen years since the
Supreme Court first declared that the right to choose abortion is consti-
tutionally protected.1 Opinions about whether the Constitution supports
a right to abortion are strongly held by those with conservative, moder-
ate, and liberal views.2 In addition to legal questions, abortion implicates
social values and philosophical and religious beliefs, which inspire its
supporters and detractors to political action and even physical violence.3
Given the politicized atmosphere surrounding the abortion issue, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court's 1991 ruling in Rust v. Sullivan4 has
received such attention from the popular press.'
1. The Court first found a constitutional basis for the right to a legal abortion in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See infra notes 112-75 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Roe and subsequent cases that have defined further women's constitutional right to
choose abortion.
2. L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 4-5 (1981).
3. One recent study of the accessibility of abortion services reported that in the United
States in 1988, 85% of facilities providing 400 abortions a year or more and 49% of smaller
clinics had experienced harassment by antiabortion activists. Harassing activities included
physical assaults, vandalism, death threats, and bomb threats. There was a high correlation
between the number of incidents of harassment and the number of abortions the clinics per-
formed. Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 23
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 246, 250 (1991) (citing NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, INCIDENTS
OF VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS (1991)). In addition, since
1991 at least seven cases have been brought in the federal courts by plaintiffs seeking injunc-
tions against antiabortion protesters. Lucero v. Operation Rescue, No. 91-7685 (1 1th Cir. filed
Feb. 5, 1992); Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir.
1991); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1991); Bench v.
Lickteig, 778 F. Supp. 31, 31-32 (D. Kan. 1991); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Doe, No. 90-CV-1084, (N.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 12, 1991); Women's Health Care Servs. v. Opera-
tion Rescue Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 260-61 (D. Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
4. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
5. Rust was one of the 1990 term's more highly visible decisions. During the three
months following the Court's decision, articles about Rust appeared regularly in the popular
press. See, e.g., Court Moves Closer to Roe v. Wade Showdown, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June
24, 1991, at 50; Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Doctors Take On Bush, TIME, Aug. 5, 1991, at 52;
The First Goes To Rust, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1991, at 8; Barbara Kantrowitz, Tipping the
Odds On Abortion, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 23; David A. Kaplan, Abortion: Just Say No
Advice: The Supreme Court Upholds Limits on Counseling, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1991, at 18;
Lewis H. Lapham, Tyromancy, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Aug. 1991, at 6; Planned Parenthood
Prexy Blasts High Court Ruling On Abortion Information, JET, June 17, 1991, at 6; Rust v.
Sullivan: A Better Debate, AMERICA, June 8, 1991, at 611; Jill Smolowe, Gagging the Clinics,
TIME, June 3, 1991, at 16. The case continues to inspire commentary. See, e.g., Abortion and
Censorship-The Piper's Tune, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1991, at 31; David G. Savage, The
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In Rust the Court declared constitutional a set of controversial fed-
eral regulations known colloquially as the Gag Rules, 6 which forbid
health care providers at publicly funded family planning clinics from
speaking with their patients about abortion.7 The case posed the kind of
questions that have been described as "the most vexing... in constitu-
tional law," which ask to what extent the government can control the
exercise of constitutional rights, particularly abortion and free speech,
through its funding decisions.8 Rust's answers to these questions shed
light on the future directions of the Court's abortion decisions. The Rust
decision also sends a strong message about the limited extent to which
the conservative Court will be willing to find constitutional protection for
individual rights against the expansion of the federal regulatory state.
This Note focuses on the Rust plaintiffs' challenge to the abortion-
counseling ban included in the Title X regulations. The issues raised in
Rust lie at the nexus between several distinct areas of the Court's consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Consequently, the Note analyzes Rust in light of
the Court's abortion decisions and the law surrounding the federal gov-
ernment's obligations and responsibilities to preserve the constitutional
rights of those who rely on the programs it funds. In particular, the Note
explores Rust's impact on the abortion choice rights of clinic clients, and
the First Amendment rights of both clients and clinic employees when
Rehnquist Court, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 29, 1991, at JI; Uncivil Rights, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1991, at 9; Who Decides?, NEw WOMAN, Oct. 1991, at 18.
6. See, e.g., Cory Richards, Viewpoint: A Future for Title X?, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
228, 228 (1991).
7. The full set of regulations contested in Rust are found at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1 to 59.17
(1991). In addition to the requirement that publicly funded clinics not counsel their patients
about abortion, id. § 59.8, the regulations prohibit publicly funded clinics from engaging in
any activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion." Id. § 59.10. The regulations
have provoked commentary since they were first published in draft form in 1987. See, e.g.,
Letter from Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, to Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (Oct. 14,
1987), in Joint Appendix at 137, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (expressing disappointment
and concern at the publication of the proposed regulations).
On March 20, 1992, the Health and Human Services Department issued guidelines for
implementing the regulations, which lift the ban on abortion counseling for doctors only. This
partial lifting of the gag rule will have little effect on clinic clients, however, because they
generally receive advice from health care providers other than physicians. Philip J. Hilts,
White House Allows Some Advice At Public Clinics About Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1992, at 1.
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1990);
see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Con-
sent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1988) (noting that questions about the constitutionality of
government conditions on its spending power have "bedeviled courts and commentators alike"
for more than 100 years).
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federal funding is involved. These explorations make clear the impor-
tance of the decision, both for women who choose abortion and for the
constitutional rights of all who are dependent on federally funded
programs.
The Court in Rust held that the federal government has a great deal
of discretion in making its funding decisions, even when those decisions
affect the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights such as the right
to choose abortion and the right to hear full information from a physi-
cian.9 According to the Rust majority, such funding decisions need not
be scrutinized against the government's purposes in enacting them be-
cause the indigent persons who rely on federal programs are made no
worse off by the government's funding choice than they would have been
in the absence of any governmental assistance.10 The Court in Rust for
the first time held that this is true not only when qualified fundamental
rights such as the right to choose abortion are affected by a federal pro-
gram, but also when First Amendment rights are implicated."
The following exploration of the situation in Rust affirms the idea
that the assumptions underlying the Court's decision are unsupported by
the reality of the effects on the indigent women served by the Title X
program. In addition, by analyzing the Court's jurisprudence in several
areas of constitutional law, this Note demonstrates that the Court's deci-
sion also is not supported by precedent, and suggests an alternative ap-
proach. It concludes that when governmental funding choices bear on
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, a compelling govern-
mental purpose must support such decisions. That principle recognizes
the reality that federal health care programs are often the only choice for
those whose financial circumstances do not permit them to seek private
treatment. The analysis employed by the Rust majority, on the other
hand, improperly allows governmental funding choices to create and sus-
tain inequities in the ability of wealthy and poor Americans to exercise
their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The Rust litigation began on February 2, 1988, when a new set of
federal regulations authorized by the Family Planning Services and Pop-
ulation Act of 1970 (Title X)12 were issued in final form by the Secretary
9. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773, 1777-78, discussed infra notes 52-111 and accompanying
text.
10. Rust, 11 S. Ct. at 1777-78; see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
11. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772; see also infra notes 214-34 and accompanying text (discussing
previous First Amendment cases).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1988). The Act's purpose was to provide federal financial
support to "public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of
voluntary family planning projects ... offer[ing] a broad range of acceptable and effective
family planning methods and services." Id. § 300(a). Priority in the provision of such services
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of Health and Human Services.13 The regulations required health care
providers in Title X project clinics14 to counsel pregnant patients on
was to be given to "persons from low-income families." Id. § 300a-4(c). "Low-income fam-
ily" is defined in the new regulations as "a family whose total annual income does not exceed
100 percent of the most recent Community Services Administration Income Poverty Guide-
lines." 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991). The most recent Guidelihes establish a before-tax annual
income of $8,450.00 as the poverty level for a nonfarm family of four persons. 45 C.F.R.
§ 1060.2-2(d)(2) (1990). The Title X definition of poverty extends the program's services to
"members of families whose annual family income exceeds this amount, but who, as deter-
mined by the Title X project director, are unable, for good reasons, to pay for family planning
services." Id § 59.2 (1991). In practice this means that Title X clinics provide free services to
all clients with incomes below the poverty level, and charge minimal fees for those with in-
comes above that level. Patricia Donovan, Family Planning Clinics: Facing Higher Costs and
Sicker Patients, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 198, 201-02 (1991). Title X's target client has an
income that is 150% of the federal definition of poverty or less. The target population consists
of approximately 14.5 million such women of childbearing age. New York v. Sullivan, 889
F.2d 401, 415 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone, J., concurring) (citing Carol I. Chervin, Note,
The Title XFamily Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy up Constitutional Rights?, 41
STAN. L. REV. 401, 408 (1989)), aff'd sub nom. Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
Title X is the only federally funded program designed exclusively to provide family plan-
ning services for the poor. Donovan, supra, at 201. In 1983, 77% of all family planning clinics
in the country received Title X support. Brief for Petitioners at 2 n.2, Rust (No. 89-1391)
(citing Aida Torres, The Effects of Federal Funding Cuts on Family Planning Services, 1980-
1983, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 134, 135 tbl. 1. (1984)). Annual appropriations to Title X are
between one and two hundred million dollars; the figure was at least 122 million dollars in
1990, making Title X the second largest source of federal monies for family planning, behind
Medicaid. Id. at 2; see Rachel B. Gold & Daniel Daley, Public Funding of Contraceptive,
Sterilization, and Abortion Services 1990, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 207 tbl. 1, 211 tbl. 4
(1991). Estimates of the number of people served range from 4.3 million people annually in
1989 to "nearly five million" low-income persons in 1990. Brief for Petitioners at 2 n.2, Rust
(No. 89-1391) (citing Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 415 n.1 (Cardamone, J., concurring) (citing
Chervin, supra, at 408)).
13. 53 Fed. Reg. 2944 (1988) (codified at42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1-.17 (1991)). The 1988 version
was substantively different from the previous rules. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1768-69; see also Brief
for Respondent at 3, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(9) (1972); 36
Fed. Reg. 18,465-66 (1971); and citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5) (1986); 45 Fed. Reg. 37,433,
37,437 (1980)); Brief for Petitioners at C-I, exhibit C, Rust (No. 89-1391) (describing chronol-
ogy of administrative interpretations between 1971 and 1988, and quoting from administrative
memoranda and from the supporting guidance document UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES (1981) [here-
inafter PROGRAM GUIDELINES]).
14. The terms "project," "program," "Title X project," and "Title X program" are de-
fined in the regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991). The general terms "project" and "program"
are "used interchangeably and mean a coherent assembly of plans, activities and supporting
resources contained within an administrative framework." Id. The more specific terms "Title
X project" and "Title X program" also are used interchangeably, and mean "the identified
program which is approved by the Secretary for support .... Title X project funds include all
funds allocated to the Title X program, including but not limited to grant funds, grant-related
income or matching funds." Id.
In this Note, to avoid confusion, the terms "project" and "Title X project" will be used
only to describe the funded clinics, and the terms "program" and "Title X program" will be
used to describe the parent organization receiving the federal funding, and having Title X
clinics as its subsidiary parts.
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proper prenatal care and to refer them to a prenatal care provider, but
forbade them to discuss the option of abortion, even in response to a
specific request."s The new rules replaced a previous set of regulatory
guidelines, in effect since 1971, which permitted Title X health care prov-
iders to offer pregnant clients nondirective counseling 16 about abortion as
well as childbirth.17
15. The regulations provide:
Prohibition on counseling and referral for abortion services; limitation of program
services to family planning.
(a)(1) A title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abor-
tion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of
family planning.
(2) Because title X funds are intended only for family planning, once a client
served by a title X project is diagnosed as pregnant, she must be referred for appro-
priate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available providers that
promote the welfare of mother and unborn child. She must also be provided with
information necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn child until such
time as the referral appointment is kept. In cases in which emergency care is re-
quired, however, the title X project shall be required only to refer the client immedi-
ately to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services.
3) A title X project may not use prenatal, social service or emergency medical
or other referrals as an indirect means of encouraging or promoting abortion as a
method of family planning, such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of health
care providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of referral providers
health care providers whose principal business is the provision of abortions, by ex-
cluding available providers who do not provide abortions, or by "steering" clients to
providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.
(4) Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as prohibiting the provision of
information to a project client which is medically necessary to assess the risks and
benefits of different methods of contraception in the course of selecting a method;
provided, that the provision of this information does not include counseling with re-
spect to or otherwise promote abortion as a method of family planning.
42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a) (1991).
42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b) sets out examples of appropriate responses, under this rule, to client
requests for information, including the following:
A pregnant woman asks the title X project to provide her with a list of abortion
providers in the area. The project tells her that it does not refer for abortion and
provides her a list which... [includes] providers which provide pre-natal care and
also provide abortions. None of the entries on the list are providers that principally
provide abortions .... Provision of the list is inconsistent with... this section.
Id. § 59.8(b)(4) (emphasis added).
16. The phrase "nondirective counseling" is not defined in the regulations, but generally is
used to describe an objective discussion of abortion as one option when a patient is faced with a
decision about her pregnancy. "Nondirective counseling" does not point the patient toward
one option or the other but rather lays out all of the facts involved in each, and allows the
patient to choose her preferred course of action.
17. See 49 Fed. Reg. 38,118 (1984); 48 Fed. Reg. 3614 (1983); 45 Fed. Reg. 37,433 (1980);
36 Fed. Reg. 18,465 (1971). In addition to the regulations themselves, the Title X program
was guided by a series of administrative memoranda and extra-regulatory guidance documents
from 1971 to the issuance of the new regulations in 1988. Brief for Petitioners at C-1, exhibit
C, Rust (No. 89-1391). All of these supporting materials consistently permitted the use of
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On the date the new regulations were issued, several sets of institu-
tional and individual plaintiffs independently brought suits in three fed-
eral districts, challenging them on three grounds. 8 The plaintiffs
claimed that the regulations (1) were not authorized by either the text of
the 1970 Act, or its supporting legislative history and congressional in-
tent;19 (2) violated the First Amendment by denying patients the right to
receive full medical information, and by forcing on them one viewpoint
while prohibiting the expression of another;2 and (3) unduly burdened
and interfered with Title X patients' Fifth Amendment rights to make
informed reproductive choices.21
Plaintiffs questioned whether the regulations' ban on abortion coun-
seling and referral was supported by the text of the 1970 Act. Section
1008 of the Title X statute provides that "[n]one of the funds appropri-
ated under [Title X] shall be used in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning. '22 While Title X funds never had been used
Title X funds for nondirective counseling about abortion as well as about proper prenatal care
and the health implications of carrying a child to term. Id. (excerpting relevant language from
administrative memoranda, from an amicus brief filed by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 661 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1981), and
from PROGRAM GUIDELINES, supra note 13). Administrative guidance prior to the 1988 regu-
lations stated: "'Mhe provision of information concerning abortion services [and] mere refer-
ral of an individual to another provider of services for an abortion.., are not considered to be
proscribed by Section 1008,'" id at C-2 (quoting Memorandum from Office of General Coun-
sel, Department of Health Education and Welfare (the predecessor agency to the Department
of Health and Human Services) (Apr. 14, 1978)). They also provided: "Women 'requesting
information on options for the management of an unintended pregnancy are to be given
nondirective counseling on the following alternative courses of action, and referral upon re-
quest: [p]renatal care and delivery[;] [i]nfant care, foster care, or adoption[;] [p]regnancy ter-
mination.' "Id at C-4 (quoting PROGRAM GUIDELINES, supra note 13).
18. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Bowen I1), aff'd sub
nom. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 540, 542 (D. Colo. 1988)
(Planned Parenthood I), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th
Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680
F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (D. Colo. 1988) (Planned Parenthood I); Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F.
Supp. 137, 140 (D. Mass. 1988) (Bowen I), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Secretary of Health & Human
Servs.), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
19. See Bowen II, 690 F. Supp. at 1265; Planned Parenthood I, 680 F. Supp. at 1466;
Bowen I, 679 F. Supp. at 139; see also Brief for Petitioners at i, Rust (No. 89-1391) (describing
the questions presented).
20. See Bowen II, 690 F. Supp. at 1265; Planned Parenthood I, 687 F. Supp. at 542;
Bowen I, 679 F. Supp. at 144-47; see also Brief for Petitioners at i, Rust (No. 89-1391) (describ-
ing the questions presented).
21. See Bowen I, 690 F. Supp. at 1265; Planned Parenthood II, 687 F. Supp. at 542;
Bowen I, 679 F. Supp. at 144-47; see also Brief for Petitioners at i, Rust (No. 89-1391) (describ-
ing the questions presented).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988). The statute originally was passed in 1970, see Family
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to provide abortions, prior to the issuance of the 1988 regulations when a
clinic patient became pregnant, Title X health care providers informed
her about all of the choices legally available to her.23 The Secretary justi-
fied the change from that interpretation to the counseling ban of the new
regulations as a necessary clarification of the scope of section 1008 of the
Act, in response to reports prepared in 1982 and 1988 calling for more
clarity in the regulations.24
Plaintiffs also suggested that the legislative history of the Act did
not support the ban on counseling.2" Furthermore, they argued, evi-
Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6, 79 Stat.
1504, three years before the Supreme Court found a constitutionally protected right to legal-
ized abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). At that time, a majority (30) of states still
had statutes criminalizing the abortion procedure. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118-19 n.2. The legislative
history of section 1008 suggests that the language was a compromise provision, intended to
prevent the use of federal funding for the performance of abortions. See S. REP. No. 1004,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 24,095-96 (1970); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1667,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5080, 5081-82.
23. Joint Appendix at 107-08, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392); see also Brief for Respon-
dent at 3, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(9) (1972); 36 Fed. Reg.
18,465, 18,466 (1971); and citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5) (1986); 45 Fed. Reg. 37,433, 37,437
(1980)). From 1981 to 1988, administrative interpretations required that pregnant Title X
patients be informed about all their legally available choices. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (Planned Parenthood III), vacated, 111
S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
24. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769; see also Brief for Respondent at 4-6, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 &
89-1392) (explaining the Secretary's attempt to clarify the proper use of Title X funds). At the
request of Senators Orrin Hatch and Jeremiah Denton, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
had audited fourteen Title X clinics in 1982. Joint Appendix at 96-97, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 &
89-1392). That audit found "no evidence that title X funds had been used to pay for abortions
or to advise clients to have abortions," id at 84, although a number of grant recipient organi-
zations were:
(1) providing both family planning services and separately funded, abortion-related
activities at a single site; (2) providing family planning counseling that did not pres-
ent alternatives to abortion; (3) engaging in referral practices that went beyond the
[Department of Health and Human Services] referral policy; (4) providing literature
that promoted abortion as a back-up method of family planning; and (5) engaging in
[separately funded] abortion lobbying activities.
Brief for Respondent at 4, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392); see also Joint Appendix at 82-136,
Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (presenting UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION AND LOBBYING AcTivrTES IN FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS
NEED CLARIFICATION (Sept. 24, 1982), and describing the audit and the inferences drawn
from it by the GAO). The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) audited 32 Title X projects,
and recommended that "'more specific, formalized direction"' should be provided to Title X
projects in order to clarify Section 1008's prohibition of abortion as a method of family plan-
ning. Brief for Respondent at 5, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (quoting 53 Fed Reg. 2923-24
(1988)).
25. Brief for Petitioners at 3 & n.6, Rust (No. 89-1391). Plaintiffs noted that "Congress
repeatedly stressed that a central purpose of Title X was to enable 'all individuals ... within
the dictates of their conscience, to exert control over their own life destinies.'" Id. at 3 n.6
(quoting 116 CONG. REc. 24,092 (1970)).
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dence presented in Title X reauthorization hearings between 1982 and
1988 indicated that Title X grant recipients were aware of and respected
the statutory and regulatory prohibition on using Title X funds to per-
form abortions.26 Congress also had considered and rejected a revision
to the Act incorporating a counseling ban during that time period.27 In
light of that evidence, plaintiffs suggested that the long-standing adminis-
trative interpretation of the Act's language should be respected.2"
Plaintiffs argued that the abortion counseling ban denied both Title
X employees and clients their First Amendment rights in several ways.
First, they asserted that prohibiting abortion counseling and referral
while at the same time requiring prenatal counseling and referral pro-
motes one viewpoint over another, which is impermissible federal con-
duct under the First Amendment.29  They also asserted that the
regulations directly violated health care providers' First Amendment
rights to inform pregnant clients about all the choices available to them,
and patients' First Amendment rights to hear that information.30 Be-
cause the regulations denied Title X clients necessary information about
abortion, their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights to choose that op-
tion also were infringed, according to plaintiffs.31
26. Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1988) (Bowen I) (citing
Family Planning Act Reauthorization, 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1985)
(statement of Dr. James 0. Mason, Acting Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (Ist
Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Family Planning Act Reauthorization,
1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1984) (statement of Margaret M. Heckler,
Secretary of Health and Human Resources)).
27. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (D. Colo. 1988)
(Planned Parenthood I), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913
F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991). In 1978 Congress rejected by a
margin of two-to-one a proposed amendment to the Title X statute, forbidding Title X funding
for "'an entity which directly or indirectly provides abortion, abortion counseling, or...
abortion referral services."' Id (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 37,045 (1978)).
28. Brief for Petitioners at 48, Rust (No. 89-1391). Plaintiffs cited INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), for the proposition that an agency's interpretation that conflicts with
its own earlier interpretation is due less deference than a consistent interpretation. Id. at 446
n.30.
29. Brief for Petitioners at 13-39, Rust (No. 89-1391). See infra text accompanying notes
214-34 for a discussion of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence when speech is federally
funded.
30. Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, 19-20, 22 n.35, Rust (No. 89-1391); see also id. at 47
n.85 (quoting Letter from Louis M. Hellman, M.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Popula-
tion Affairs, HHS, to Hilary H. Connor, M.D., Regional Health Administrator (Nov. 16,
1976), for the proposition that "[a] counselor working under.., a physician... has not only a
First Amendment right but [a] duty to inform a patient of all legal options.").
31. Id. at 31-36.
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In 1988 two of the three district courts, in Massachusetts and Den-
ver, agreed with plaintiffs and enjoined the implementation of the new
Title X regulations as unconstitutional and unsupported by the statute's
language and congressional intent.32 In examining the rules under the
First and Fifth Amendments, both courts employed a strict scrutiny
analysis to reach their conclusions.33 Neither court found a sufficiently
compelling governmental purpose to support the regulations' direct
speech restrictions. 34  Title X patients' Fifth Amendment rights also
were violated by the regulations, said the two district courts, because the
lack of information about abortion burdened their decision about
whether to carry a child to term or to have an abortion.35 In addition,
the Massachusetts court declared that the regulations imposed an uncon-
stitutional penalty on clinics that counsel patients about the abortion op-
tion, which is speech protected by the First Amendment, by denying
them Title X funding on that basis.3 6
Meanwhile, a district court in New York upheld the regulations,
granting summary judgment to the defendant Department of Health and
Human Services, in New York v. Bowen.37 The court declared that the
statute reasonably supported the federal regulations and the regulations
simply did not violate the constitutional rights of health care providers or
clinic patients.3 1 Unlike the district courts in Massachusetts and Colo-
32. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 540, 542 (D. Colo. 1988)
(Planned Parenthood II), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913
F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F.
Supp. 137, 147 (D. Mass. 1988) (Bowen I), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (lst Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
33. Planned Parenthood I1, 687 F. Supp. at 543; Bowen 1, 679 F. Supp. at 144-47.
34. Planned Parenthood I1, 687 F. Supp. at 544; Bowen I, 679 F. Supp. at 145-47.
35. Bowen I, 679 F. Supp. at 147; Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F.
Supp. 1465, 1474 (D. Colo. 1988) (Planned Parenthood I).
36. Bowen 1, 679 F. Supp. at 144-45 ("The government may not penalize an individual for
exercising his or her First Amendment rights, even if the penalty is the denial of a government
benefit .... .") (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
37. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1272-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Bowen II), aff'd
sub nor. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Rust, 111 S. Ct.
1759 (1991). This case consolidated two separate actions, one brought by the State of New
York through its Department of Health (a Title X grantee) and the second brought by Dr.
Irving Rust and several other Title X project clinic supervisors. Brief for Petitioners at 13-14,
Rust (No. 89-1391).
38. Bowen I1, 690 F. Supp. at 1266-74. The court found "no explicit guidance, or even
illumination" regarding congressional intent from the statute's 1970 legislative history or de-
bates about subsequent amendments. Id. at 1267-69. The regulations were found constitu-
tional because they "do not prohibit or compel speech." Id at 1274. Furthermore, the
regulations represent only "'a [governmental] value judgment favoring childbirth over abor-
tion.'" Id. at 1272 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). As such, the district
court held them acceptable, without analyzing the extent to which they were supported by any
compelling or rational governmental purpose, noting that "Et]he condition that federal funds
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rado, the New York court made no attempt to weigh the government's
interest in the regulation against the speech rights of Title X health care
providers and patients or the pregnant patients' right to choose between
the options of abortion and childbirth.39
On appeal, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and the
Tenth Circuits found the regulations supported by the enabling statute
and within the Secretary's authority to enact.4' Both appellate courts,
however, after closely analyzing the regulations under the First and Fifth
Amendments, found them unconstitutional and therefore invalid.41 The
First Circuit held that the regulations "force all Title X projects to pro-
vide incomplete and skewed information and to withhold requested, pos-
sibly even medically advisable, information,"'42 thereby "wholly
subordinating constitutional ... interests ... in an effort to deter a wo-
man from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make." 43
The Tenth Circuit concurred with this analysis.'
A split panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, upheld the New York district court's decision finding
the regulations constitutional.4 5 Like the district court, the Second Cir-
will be given only to those who support particular views does not violate constitutional rights."
Id. at 1273.
39. See id at 1272-74. At no point in its analysis of the constitutionality of the regula-
tions did the court employ a balancing test, either at the rational-basis or strict level of scru-
tiny. Presumably, although not explicitly, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), that "a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not
subject to strict scrutiny." Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-97
(1976)).
40. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497-98 (10th Cir.
1990) (Planned Parenthood II), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Massachusetts v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs. (Secretary of Health & Human Servs.), 899 F.2d 53, 57-64 (1st Cir.
1990) (en bane), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
41. Planned Parenthood 111, 913 F.2d at 1501-04; Secretary of Health & Human Sers.,
899 F.2d at 72-75.
42. Secretary of Health & Human Serys., 899 F.2d at 66.
43. Id. (paraphrasing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986)).
44. Planned Parenthood 11I, 913 F.2d at 1495, 1501. The court rejected the government's
argument that the regulations represented only a decision to fund childbirth over abortion. Id.
at 1499. The court noted that the government does not control all clinics and hospitals
through the regulations, but it suggested that the Title X program is large enough to have
cornered the market on reproductive health care provision to low-income women. Id. This
point, coupled with the fact that the regulations require that pregnant patients receive prenatal
counseling and referral, supported the court's opinion that the regulations affected low-income
women's rights to choose an abortion. Id at 1499-501.
45. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 410-14 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'dsub nom. Rust, 111
S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The court found the regulations to be a "construction of the statute that
legitimately effectuates Congressional intent." Id. at 407 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
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cuit found that the regulations represented only a governmental choice to
fund one activity (childbirth) and not another (abortion).46 The court
distinguished that choice, which in its view only encouraged childbirth,
from an affirmative governmental action to block abortion. 7 Agreeing
that the regulations would "hamper or impede" Title X patients seeking
abortions, the court nevertheless said that they did not present any "af-
firmative legal obstacle" to the abortion decision." The actual effects of
the funding decision, said the Second Circuit, were therefore "constitu-
tionally irrelevant."'49 Similar reasoning supported the court's determi-
nation that the rules infringed no First Amendment rights."
Characterizing the counseling ban as a permissible funding choice, the
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). Discussing the scope of the
regulations and the statute, the court carefully stated its interpretation that the regulations
"allow a [Title X health care] provider to respond to a client's inquiry for information about
abortion by furnishing the name of abortion providers, but only in a prescribed fashion." Id.
at 405. Referral lists were required to be weighted towards providers of prenatal care, but
could include facilities providing abortion-related services, according to the court. Id. The
Second Circuit went on to discuss at length its view that the rules permit a Title X clinic to
have a copy of the Yellow Pages in its offices, and that they do not preclude clinic employees
from giving the Yellow Pages to a client who asks for help in finding a health care provider
who is able to counsel on or perform abortions. Id at 406 & n.1 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 2922,
2941-42 (1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1991)). A dissenting opinion noted that counsel
for the defendant Secretary of Health and Human Services had stated at oral argument that
the regulations would not permit Title X clinics to provide the Yellow Pages to their clients.
Id. at 417 (Kearse, J., dissenting in part). The concurring opinion in Sullivan left the door
open for future plaintiffs to challenge the implementation of the rules. Id. at 414-15
(Cardamone, J., concurring).
46. Id at 410-11. The court prefaced this conclusion by noting that the government is not
obligated constitutionally to subsidize fundamental rights. Id. at 410 (citing Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1977); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas,
J., concurring)).
47. Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475).
48. Id. at 411. The dissent strongly disagreed, finding that "[b]y damming the flow of
information from physician to patient, the ... regulations impermissibly impede a woman's
exercise of her constitutional privacy right [to choose abortion]." Id at 417 (Kearse, J., dis-
senting in part). "Time and time again the Supreme Court has emphasized that governmental
regulation violates a woman's right to choose between childbirth and abortion when it inter-
feres with the information and advice she may be given by her physician." Id (citing Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 463 U.S. 416, 429-30 (1983)).
49. Id. at 411 (relying on Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10
(1989)).
50. Id at 412 (relying on Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50
(1983), to support the conclusion that the regulations represented only a legitimate govern-
mental decision not to subsidize the right to speech, thereby requiring no judicial weighing of
the impact of that decision against the government's interest). The court qualified this finding,
suggesting that First Amendment questions might be raised if the regulations were interpreted
to limit the availability of abortion counseling to a private patient whose "regular" physician
practiced out of a Title X funded institution. Id. at 413-14. The court made it clear that, in its
view, the regulations require the health care providers only to state that clinics do not offer
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court again supported its decision with the view that the government is
under no obligation to subsidize constitutional rights. 1
It was the Second Circuit case that the Supreme Court agreed to
hear, as Rust v. Sullivan.52 By a five-to-four vote, the Court held that the
regulations were a permissible construction of the statute, did not repre-
sent an unconstitutional condition on a federal subsidy, and did not
otherwise violate the First or Fifth Amendments. 3 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist wrote for the majority; three justices filed dissenting opinions. 4
The majority's two-part analysis first reviewed the doctrines of stat-
utory construction and administrative law that the Court declared al-
lowed it to consider issues related to the regulations' substance.55 When
a statute is ambiguous, a long-standing doctrine requires federal courts to
read its language so as "'to avoid serious doubt of [its] constitutional-
ity.' "56 The Rust majority declared that because the regulations did not
raise any "'grave and doubtful constitutional questions,'" this doctrine
did not apply. 7 While acknowledging that plaintiffs had raised constitu-
tional challenges, the majority reasoned that they were inspired by the
controversial political nature of the abortion issue, and not by the con-
abortion counseling, and for that reason, the regulations do not promote unconstitutionally
childbirth over abortion. Id at 414.
51. Id at 412.
52. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
53. Id at 1768-78. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Souter were in the majority; Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor constituted
the dissent. One observer of the oral argument has expressed surprise at Justice Souter's vote,
given the tenor and direction of his questions to the Solicitor General. Justice Souter pressed
the Solicitor General for information about whether a physician could counsel a Title X pa-
tient about abortion when there was potential risk of a health problem. Telephone Interview
with Walter Dellinger, Professor of Law, Duke University (Sept. 24, 1991); see also Official
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-42, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (documenting ques-
tions Justices Scalia, Souter, and Stevens asked Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor General); infra
note 203 (describing the Solicitor General's response to this line of questioning).
54. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined and in
which Justices O'Connor and Stevens joined in part. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778-86 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Blackmun's dissent was divided into three sections: first, a discussion of statu-
tory construction and administrative law doctrines, which allowed the Court to reach the con-
stitutional issues raised by plaintiffs; second, an analysis of the First Amendment claims; and
third, an analysis of the Fifth Amendment challenge. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor joined only the first part, while Justice Stevens joined only the last two parts of the
dissent. Id at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See id at 1767-71.
56. Id at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749
(1961) and citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1771 (quoting United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
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tent of the new Title X regulations.5 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist next analyzed the case under the adminis-
trative law doctrine of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 9 which grants substantial deference to agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes.' Because of the Title X statute's ambiguity,
the majority held that the regulations were due substantial deference
under Chevron,61 even though the new Title X regulations were signifi-
cantly different from the administrative interpretations that had been in
place for seventeen years.62 The Court noted that it found the regula-
tions to be a permissible statutory construction, supported by "reasoned
analysis" in response to a "shift in attitude against ... abortion."63
By so analyzing the doctrines of statutory construction and Chevron,
the majority was able to reach the constitutional questions. Addressing
the First Amendment challenges, the Court declared that the new Title
X regulations were not viewpoint-discriminatory constraints on pro-
tected speech even though the rules prohibit abortion couns'eling while
mandating prenatal counseling for Title X clients." Again, the majority
followed the Second CircUit's analysis, declaring the regulations an ac-
ceptable exercise of the government's funding authority: a choice to
"subsidize family planning services which will lead to conception and
childbirth,"6 not an attempt to suppress ideas. 66 Chief Justice Rehn-
58. Id.
59. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
60. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). The Chevron doctrine has
been described by one noted commentator as "a pillar in administrative law... a kind of
Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state," and as "one of the very few defin-
ing cases in the last twenty years of American public law." Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdmin-
istration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (finding an analogy between
Chevron and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
61. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767-69. In addition to noting the ambiguity of the underlying
statute, the majority also agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion that the legislative his-
tory was ambiguous because Congress had not grappled directly with or spoken on the ques-
tions of abortion counseling, referral, or advocacy. Id at 1768.
62. Id. at 1768-69. The previous administrative policy was in effect between 1971 and the
date of issuance of the new regulations in 1988. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
63. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The Court did not clarify whether the changed circum-
stances in Rust were due to a shift in public attitude or in the administration's policy toward
abortion. Id.
64. Id. at 1771-73. The First Amendment doctrine of viewpoint-discriminatory speech
specifies that regulation of speech that excludes one viewpoint while promoting another is
unconstitutional, unless the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1988); see also infra notes
221-26 and accompanying text (describing the treatment of viewpoint-discriminatory speech
regulations under the First Amendment).
65. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980); Maher
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quist stated expressly that "when the government appropriates public
funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that pro-
gram."67 The Court further maintained that the regulations would not
"significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship," and con-
cluded that there was no need to consider whether that relationship
should be specially protected against indirect governmental regulation
through funding decisions. 8
In its First Amendment analysis, the majority, like the Second Cir-
cuit, did not balance the government's interest in the speech restriction
against the Title X employees' right to speak or the Title X patients'
right to listen. By describing the abortion counseling ban as the result of
a funding choice between types of speech (between abortion counseling
and prenatal counseling) and not a content- or viewpoint-based restric-
tion within a type of speech (counseling), the Court declared that it was
unnecessary to scrutinize the speech restriction at all.69
Having dismissed plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the major-
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-77 (1977)). Chief Justice Rehnquist also found support in a quota-
tion from Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983): "'a legislature's deci-
sion not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.'" Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549).
66. According to the majority, because Congress intended Title X to have only a limited
scope, not extending to serving pregnant patients, a Title X health care provider could prop-
erly also be prohibited from offering or providing prenatal advice and care to a patient. Rust,
111 S. Ct. at 1772.
67. Id. at 1773. The majority did go on to note, however, that government funding is not
"invariably sufficient to justify government control over the content of expression." Id. at
1776. The content of speech expression in a public forum cannot be infringed, for example.
Id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 111 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990)).
68. Id. at 1776. The Court reasoned that because nothing in the regulations requires a
doctor to say anything to a patient that she or he does not believe, the regulations do not
encroach upon or negatively affect the physician-patient relationship. Id. The Court con-
trasted the doctor-patient relationship with that between professors and students, which is
specially protected against indirect regulation through subsidy. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-06 (1967)). The majority declared that because the doctor-
patient relationship established under Title X is a limited one, a Title X patient will not be
misled by the absence of dialogue about abortion. Id.
69. See id at 1774-75. The Court relied on Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461
U.S. 540 (1983) for this analysis. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774-75. Regan upheld sections of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (1988), that denied income tax deductions for
private contributions to nonprofit corporations engaging in political lobbying, while allowing
the deduction if the nonprofit corporation did not lobby. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46 (citing
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959), for the proposition that the govern-
ment constitutionally can choose whether to fund a particular type of speech, in this instance
lobbying). The Regan Court found no need to apply strict scrutiny to the statute. Id. at 548-
50. In Rust the majority declared that funding speech about childbirth but not about abortion
was analogous to the congressional decision not to fund all nonprofit lobbying upheld in Re-
gan. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
Direct regulatory restrictions on the fundamental right to free speech are (with limited
1992] ABORTION SPEECH RIGHTS 1637
ity proceeded to reject the contention that the regulations imposed an
unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funding.70 Again the
majority characterized the regulations as merely an instance of an ac-
ceptable governmental funding choice, noting that "the government is
not denying a benefit to anyone." 71 To support this analysis Chief Justice
Rehnquist defined the "benefit" as the grant to the Title X organization,
not the medical services provided by that organization to the Title X
clients.72 By distinguishing between the grantee organization as the re-
cipient of the benefit (Title X dollars) and the Title Xproject, the subsidi-
ary of the grantee organization employing the health care provider, the
majority avoided the unconstitutional-conditions issue by declaring the
doctrine applicable only when the recipient of the funds is the entity on
which the condition is placed.73 Here, the majority said, the benefit ac-
exceptions) subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text
(describing the strict-scrutiny requirement in First Amendment cases).
70. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "holds that
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitu-
tional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1989). The doctrine stems
from a line of cases that protect such fundamental rights as free speech, free association, reli-
gion, and privacy. Id. at 1416 & nn.4-6; see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 144-46 (1987) (religious freedom); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
398-99 (1984) (free speech); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981) (religious
freedom); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 371 (1976) (freedom of association); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 & n.6 (1968) (free speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 409-10 (1963) (religious freedom); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (free
speech). Because the doctrine is "riven with inconsistencies," Sullivan, supra, at 1415 (noting
the Maher-McRae line of cases, infra text accompanying notes 142-68, as an example), its
usefulness as an analytical tool is limited. The doctrine seems likely to fall further from favor;
now-retired Justice Brennan was its champion, id, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions
reflect his desire to reject the doctrine completely, id at 1417, 1441-42 (citing Regan, 461 U.S.
at 549; League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 403-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). See generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 681-85 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining the doctrine and describing it as "now somewhat eroded"); Epstein, supra note 8,
at 7-14 (describing the doctrine); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitu-
tional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321, 323-58 (1935) (describing the early history of the doc-
trine); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1352-59 (1984) (describing the doctrine); Sunstein, supra note
8, at 597-620 (declaring that the traditional view of the doctrine is rooted in the Lochner era,
and therefore obsolete, but suggesting that analysis of constitutional questions in publicly
funded contexts is valid and necessary).
71. Rust, IlI S. Ct. at 1774.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1774-75. By holding that the grantee could engage in abortion-related speech so
long as it was segregated from the Title X project, the majority implicitly interposed that
petitioners had failed to show sufficient similarity between the Title X case and the facts of
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398-99 (1984), which invalidated a statute requiring
federally funded radio and television stations not to engage in editorializing. Rust, 111 S. Ct.
at 1774.
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crues to the grantee as a whole, and the condition is imposed only on the
grantee's subsidiary project.74 According to the Court, the regulations
did not force the entire grantee organization to give up abortion-related
speech, but only to segregate it to the portions of its operations that did
not receive Title X funding.75
To illustrate the Court's reasoning, suppose that a Title X grant is
made to the regional offices of an organization such as Planned
Parenthood, which then distributes the money to various neighborhood
Title X clinics which are its subsidiaries. According to the Rust major-
ity's analysis, governmental control over abortion-related speech at the
neighborhood clinics was not an unconstitutional condition on receipt of
a subsidy because it was the parent organization that benefitted from the
federal grant, not the subsidiary clinic, while the speech restriction would
occur only at the clinic. The Court did not analyze fully whether the
requirement that Title X patients give up their rights to hear abortion-
related information to obtain the benefit of the Title X services was an
unconstitutional condition on receipt of a subsidy.76 Although the ma-
jority did not ignore this problem completely, it held the question inap-
posite to the Title X situation, because the regulations do not deny Title
X clients other opportunities to receive abortion counseling."
7
The Court analyzed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims just as it
had the First Amendment and unconstitutional-conditions questions.78
First, the majority framed the issue as a mere governmental funding deci-
sion, having no impact on constitutional rights.79 Because the govern-
ment has no duty to subsidize even fundamental rights, the majority
reasoned, regulations denying funding to abortion-related speech did not
infringe directly on a woman's right to choose abortion 0 In the Court's
opinion, Title X patients were no worse off under the new rules than they
would have been in the absence of any federally financed program,"' and
74. Rust, 11l S. Ct. at 1774.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1774-76.
77. Id at 1777. But see infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text (noting that the regula-
tions effectively deny indigent patients other opportunities for counseling).
78. Plaintiffs claimed that by denying pregnant Title X patients full information about
their legal options, the regulations impermissibly interfered with their Fifth Amendment right
to choose an abortion. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of plain-
tiffs' claims.
79. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776-78.
80. Id. at 1776 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)).
81. Id. at 1777-78. This "no worse off" analysis differed from the view taken by the
Second Circuit in the case below, which was that because a funding decision was involved, the
actual effects of the regulation were irrelevant. See supra text accompanying note 49 (discuss-
ing the Second Circuit's analysis on this point).
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therefore the abortion counseling ban did not impermissibly burden pa-
tient's Fifth Amendment rights to choose an abortion.82
Furthermore, the majority pointedly declared that it did not read
the regulations as prohibiting a Title X employee from counseling or re-
ferring for abortion a patient whose pregnancy places her life in "immi-
nent peril."8" In that situation, neither the statutory language nor the
regulations would apply, according to the Court, because counseling
abortion to save a woman's life is not the same as counseling abortion as
"'a method of family planning.' "84 The majority did not state how seri-
ous the health-threatening situation must be in order to avoid the regula-
tions' ban on abortion counseling. 5
Finally, the majority argued that patients' rights to informed medi-
cal self-determination would not be affected by the abortion counseling
ban.8 6 The Court found that patients would not be denied completely the
information necessary to make an informed choice between abortion and
childbirth, because it still would be available from other sources. 87 The
majority distinguished the Title X regulations from the local and state
abortion regulations found unconstitutional in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health "' and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists. 9 The critical issue in those cases, said the
majority, was that all physicians and all women would have been affected
by the challenged restrictions, not just employees or patients of federally
funded clinics. 90 In this case only Title X patients and employees would
be affected, and would remain free both to seek counseling from other
sources and to speak about abortion outside the Title X context.9 '
82. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777. In Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court held that
an abortion regulation is not unconstitutional unless it "unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion." Id. at 147. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 314 (1980) upheld this standard. For a discussion of these cases, see infra text ac-
companying notes 142-68.
83. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
84. Id. at 1772 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)).
85. See id. at 1773. Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, at oral argument, offered the
view that the Title X regulations prohibit a project physician from recommending that a pa-
tient consider abortion even when the doctor's examination reveals the likelihood that an
emergency will occur if the patient continues the pregnancy to term. Rather, under Solicitor
General Starr's reading, the physician must be confronted directly with an emergency to avoid
the abortion counseling ban. Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-48, Rust (Nos. 89-
1391 & 89-1392).
86. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
87. Id.
88. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Akron is discussed infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
89. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
90. Rust, III S. Ct. at 1777-78.
91. Id. at 1777.
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Each of the Rust dissenters strongly disagreed with the Court's stat-
utory construction analysis and noted that the majority had narrowed
the doctrine significantly.92 Indeed, Justice O'Connor looked no further
than this issue in rejecting the majority's holding.93
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dis-
sented vehemently from the majority's analysis of the regulations' consti-
tutionality.94 Justice Blackmun argued that the speech restrictions in the
Title X counseling provisions violated the First Amendment because
they were content- and viewpoint-based, and insufficiently justified by
governmental interest.95 He distinguished the Court's holding in Regan
v. Taxation with Representation,96 on which the majority had relied, as
permitting a governmental funding decision based only on the type of
speech involved, rather than its content or the viewpoints expressed. 97
92. Id at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Casting aside established principles of statu-
tory construction and administrative jurisprudence, the majority in these cases today unneces-
sarily passes upon important questions of constitutional law.") (quoting Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961), and citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78
(1982); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895)); id at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988)). Having thus noted the doctrine, Justice Blackmun (joined in this portion by
Justices Marshall and O'Connor) concluded that the Second Circuit's decision should be re-
versed in favor of a plainly constitutional regulatory construction of the statute. Id. at 1780
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He reached an analysis of the constitutional questions in his dis-
sent only because he so strongly disagreed with the majority that he felt compelled to respond
to its analysis. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that her deference to
the doctrine would not permit her to join the portions of Justice Blackmun's dissent in which
he analyzed the constitutional questions surrounding the regulations. Id. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). In her view, the regulations raised significant First Amendment questions, particu-
larly concerning their "content-based restrictions on the speech of Title X fund recipients."
Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While not reaching the question herself, Justice O'Connor sug-
gested that were she to analyze the regulations under the First Amendment, she might well
accept Justice Blackmun's view that the regulations were unconstitutional. See id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 1778-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1780-81, 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun found the counsel-
ing regulations to be content-based restrictions because they permit Title X health care provid-
ers to talk about "any of a wide range of family planning and other topics, save abortion," and
so represent a prohibition of discussion of an entire topic. Id. at 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)). Further, in his belief the regulations are viewpoint-based
because they not only prohibit abortion-related speech, but compel speech about maternal and
fetal health, and because they prohibit only prochoice speech, not speech in favor of the alter-
native position. Id at 1781-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
97. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "if the... Regulations
were confined to non-ideological limitations upon the use of Title X funds for lobbying activi-
ties, there would exist no violation of the First Amendment").
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Because the Title X speech restrictions were content-based, the dissent
argued, the regulations represented a clearly unconstitutional condition
on the receipt of federal funding.98
After concluding that the counseling restrictions were content- and
viewpoint-based, Justice Blackmun balanced the governmental interest in
the regulations against the interest of those whose speech rights they in-
fringed. 99 Justice Blackmun pointed out that a health professional's in-
terests include an ethical obligation to provide patients with complete
information,"°° and that patients have interests in receiving complete in-
formation from which to make an intelligent health care decision.' The
government's stated purpose, according to the dissent, was to ensure that
Title X funds were "not spent for a purpose outside the scope of the
program," 0 2 and that was hardly sufficient to justify the regulations'
constraints on the interests of the health care providers and their pa-
tients. 103 According to Justice Blackmun, even had this purpose been
98. Id. at 1782-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that "[w]hatever
may be the Government's power to condition the receipt of its largess upon the relinquishment
of constitutional rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that suppresses the recipient's
cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or viewpoint of that speech." Id. at
1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958)).
Speech restrictions attached to a subsidy, he said, act effectively as an indirect penalty on
speech, which is no more constitutionally acceptable than a direct penalty. Id. at 1782-83
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
99. Id. at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDI-
CIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS 8.08
(1989); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 70
(1982)).
101. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Defining the government's objectives and assessing
their importance relative to the importance of the affected parties' rights are the first steps in
the two-part test for determining the constitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions on
speech set out in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). See infra notes 221-26 for a discus-
sion of this analysis.
102. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He noted: "[T]he speech the Secretary would suppress
is truthful information regarding constitutionally protected conduct of vital importance to the
listener. One can imagine no legitimate government interest that might be served by sup-
pressing such information." Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was impressed
especially by the fact that it is the relationship between a health care provider and his or her
patient that is affected by the regulations. As the author of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
he had emphasized the importance of consultation between physician and patient, see id. at
153, 163-66, and he continued that emphasis in his Rust dissent. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783,
1785-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that:
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust.
The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress often attendant
to health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete confidence, and
often their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals.... It is for this reason
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more compelling, the regulations were not tailored narrowly to serve it
and would fail on that basis."1 4 Justice Blackmun then contrasted the
stated governmental objective with the government's actual motive,
which he characterized as an attempt to distort the doctor-patient dia-
logue and thereby reduce the incidence of abortion. 105
Justice Blackmun reserved his strongest criticism for the majority's
Fifth Amendment analysis."0 6 He chastised the majority for missing the
critical Fifth Amendment point: that the right in question was not an
indigent woman's right to a subsidy, but rather her right "to be free from
affirmative governmental interference in her decision." ' 7 Characterizing
the new rules as coercive, Justice Blackmun argued that their viewpoint
bias and the fact that they "suppress[ ] medically pertinent information"
create an obstacle to Title X patients' exercise of their Fifth Amendment
rights to choose whether to continue pregnancies to term.108 Because
that right is personal to every indigent pregnant woman, he argued, the
fact that the rules keep critical information from even one patient makes
them unconstitutional with respect to her, regardless of their effects on
other women, wealthy or poor.109 Finally, Justice Blackmun commented
that the majority's interpretation of the rules as allowing abortion refer-
ral when the woman's life is endangered by the pregnancy was essential
to keep the regulations from violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
that we have guarded so jealously the doctor/patient dialogue from governmental
intrusion. "[I]n Roe and subsequent cases we have 'stressed repeatedly the central
role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to
have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out.'"
Id at 1785-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447 (1983) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387
(1979))).
104. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). With this analysis, Justice
Blackmun applied the second part of the two-part test for determining the constitutionality of
viewpoint-based restrictions on speech set out in Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. See infra notes 223-26
and accompanying text for a discussion of the test. The majority opinion had, in a footnote,
declared the regulations to be "narrowly tailored" to fit congressional intent that Title X mon-
ies not be "used in a program where abortion is a method of family planning," Rust, 111 S. Ct.
at 1773 n.4, but had not analyzed the sufficiency of the governmental purpose. Justice Black-
mun noted that "[b]y failing to balance or even to consider the free speech interest claimed by
Title X physicians against the Government's asserted interest in suppressing the speech, the
Court falters in its duty to implement the protection that the First Amendment clearly pro-
vides for this important message." Id. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the definition of family
planning in 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991) states that family planning "should reduce the incidence
of abortion").
106. See id. at 1784-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
108. Id. at 1784-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cess Clause.11° He also pointed out that the Solicitor General's oral ar-
gument had not supported such a lenient interpretation, but had
advocated a position inconsistent with the basic holding in Roe v.
Wade.1 I
THE LAW BEFORE RUST: ABORTION, SPEECH,
AND FEDERAL FUNDING
The history of the Court's decisions on abortion generally, and on
federally funded abortion in particular, are obviously important in under-
standing Rust, and this section will first focus on those areas of the law.
To the extent that Rust upholds regulatory language that refuses abor-
tion referral to women whose health is threatened seriously by continu-
ing a pregnancy, the decision has a significant impact on abortion law.
Beyond the abortion context, Rust has important implications for
the government's ability to control other fundamental rights, particularly
free speech rights, which are enabled by publicly funded programs. In
order to gauge the extent to which Rust changes that body of law, the
Note discusses the Court's decisions concerning the First Amendment,
especially in publicly funded contexts, and analyzes Rust in light of this
jurisprudence.
Three lines of cases concerning the right to abortion are critical to a
complete understanding of Rust's effect on abortion law: cases that de-
fine and describe the right; cases that indicate the government's responsi-
bility to enable the exercise of the right; and finally, cases that specify the
government's role in the physician-patient dialogue.
WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE ABORTION FREE
OF STATE INTERFERENCE
In Roe v. Wade112 a seven-to-two majority of the Court established
that "the right of privacy.., founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty . . . encompass[es] a woman's decision
110. Id. at 1786 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983) (analyzing due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982) (same)).
111. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-47,
Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392)); see infra notes 112-36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe, like its companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
involved a challenge to a state statute criminalizing abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. Both cases
were decided over a dissent by then-Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Doe, 410 U.S. at 223 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 1 13 A privacy right previ-
ously had been found to protect "activities relating to marriage; procrea-
tion; contraception; family relationships; and child rearing and
education."' I14 The Court declared that whether the privacy right was
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment or implicit in the language of
other constitutional amendments, including the Fifth Amendment, it in-
cluded the right to decide to have an abortion. 115
Roe defined the privacy right in the abortion context as "not unqual-
ified."'1 16 Specifically, the Roe Court held that a state could regulate a
woman's right to choose whether to carry her pregnancy to term only if
it had a compelling reason.117 The state's dual interest-protecting ma-
ternal health and the potential life of the fetus-was held never to exceed
the mother's own interest in her life and health, however. 118 Under Roe,
a state never could prohibit abortion "where it is necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother." 119 With that exception, the Roe Court announced a framework
for acceptable state regulations of abortion, based on the three trimesters
of a pregnancy. 120 The choice of this framework was based on two fac-
tors. First, abortion in the earlier stages of pregnancy is a safer proce-
dure for the mother than is childbirth, and second, a fetus is not viable
113. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-54 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child
rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same)). The Court
noted in Roe that the privacy right, while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, previ-
ously had been recognized under the "penumbras" surrounding the Bill of Rights generally, id.
at 152 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1965)); the First Amendment,
id (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
id (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-35 (1886)); the Ninth Amendment, id. (citing
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring)); and the Fourteenth Amendment, id.
(citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
115. Id. at 152-53; see supra note 114. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to fed-
eral government actions, states: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
116. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
117. Id at 155.
118. d at 164-65.
119. Id.
120. A trimester is three months long: a pregnancy of nine months' duration therefore is
divided into three trimesters. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2445
(4th ed. 1976).
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outside the womb until a certain point during the pregnancy.121 As a
pregnancy proceeds to term, the risk of maternal death during abortion
increases until it is equal to the risk of death during childbirth. 122 When
Roe was decided, the risks became equivalent at the end of the first tri-
mester.1 23 Therefore, -during the first trimester of the pregnancy, the
Court held that a woman's privacy interest outweighed the state's inter-
est in regulation such that she was free to choose an abortion, in consul-
tation with her physician, without any interference from the state. 24
During the second and third trimesters, however, the state could regulate
the abortion procedure so long as the regulation was "reasonably re-
late[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health." '125 The
Roe Court further established that during the portion of the pregnancy
after fetal viability, 126 the state may go so far as to prohibit abortion
altogether, except in cases in which continuation of the pregnancy endan-
gers maternal life or health.127
Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe, criticizing both the major-
ity's characterization of and analytical source for the woman's right to
choose abortion. 128  While recognizing that persons have Fourteenth
Amendment interests in freedom from unwanted state regulation, he dis-
missed the notion that those claims could be called privacy rights.'29 He
noted that the "transaction resulting in an operation such as [abortion] is
not 'private' in the ordinary usage of that word."' 130 He also looked to
the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding no evi-
dence that they meant to allow a fundamental "right to abortion" be-
cause in 1868 a majority of states had statutes limiting abortion.1 31
121. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 159, 162-63.
122. See id. at 150. The risk to the woman's health posed by abortion continually increases
as the pregnancy advances. Id.
123. Id. at 163. The Court recognized that its understanding of the issue was based on the
medical knowledge of the time and that advances in medical science and technology change
understandings about medical risks. Id. at 149, 163.
124. Id. at 163.
125. Ia
126. Viability, defined as the point during the pregnancy at which the fetus can survive
independently of the mother, according to the Roe Court is "usually placed at about ... 28
weeks [after conception] but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160 (citing DoR-
LAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965); Louis M. HELLMAN &
JACK A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971)).
127. Id. at 164-65.
128. See id. at 172-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). While noting that 36 states had enacted
"abortion laws" in 1868, some of them still in effect in 1973, id. at 175-76 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), then-Justice Rehnquist did not explain the scope of those laws. The Texas statute
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In the portion of his dissent that presaged his opinions in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services 132 and Rust, Justice Rehnquist disagreed
with the majority's "sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion
during the first trimester," and its requirement that the state show a com-
pelling interest to justify the regulation of abortion thereafter. 133 He crit-
icized the majority for balancing the state's interest in regulation against
the woman's privacy interest, noting that such a test is appropriate more
to legislative policy analysis than to a judicial determination.' 34 Finally,
because Justice Rehnquist believed the right in question was not funda-
mental, he stated his preference for a less stringent test to uphold abor-
tion regulation: a showing that the law has a rational relationship to a
valid state objective. 135
The majority opinion in Roe evinced not only a concern for women's
health and a strong sense of judicial respect for the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, but also recognized women's need to make informed medical
decisions. 136 Several important cases decided in the years following Roe
focused on these aspects of the abortion question, further interpreting the
permissible limits of governmental involvement in a woman's right to
choose. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,'37 decided in 1976, the
Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring that pregnant women electing
first trimester abortions sign consent statements indicating that their
abortion choice was fully informed and freely made. 138 In addition, the
Court invalidated a portion of the statute requiring physicians to attempt
to preserve fetal life even when performing first trimester abortions, be-
cause the statute failed to respect Roe's paramount interest in maternal
health during the first portion of the pregnancy.139 Similarly, the Court's
in question criminalized the performance of abortion unless the mother's life was endangered
by the pregnancy. Id at 117-18. The majority opinion addressed the generally accepted rea-
sons for the abortion statutes in effect in the mid-19th century: concern about the safety of the
abortion procedure, an interest in reducing the high mortality rate then associated with abor-
tion, and the state's interest in preserving fetal life. Ia at 147-152.
132. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
133. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. Id at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
137. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
138. Id at 65-67. The Court noted that the abortion decision "is an important, and often a
stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences." Id at 67. The Court further noted that for its purposes the term
"informed consent" meant "giving... information to the patient as to just what would be
done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his pro-
fession." Id. at 67 n.8.
139. Id. at 81-84.
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1979 decision in Colautti v. Franklin 14 reaffirmed the Roe majority's in-
sistence that the Fourteenth Amendment requires protection of maternal
health over the life of the fetus during the first trimester of pregnancy.1 4 1
During the post-Danforth period, however, the Court decided a pair
of cases concerning public funding for abortion that defined the abortion
choice for indigent women.' 42 In Maher v. Roe 143 the Court held the
federal government was not obligated to pay for nontherapeutic abor-
tions1" through its Medicaid programs and that a state's policy decision
to use its federal funds to support childbirth expenses but not the abor-
tion choice of indigent women did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 In Harris v. McRae,146 decided
in 1980, the Court reaffirmed Maher's analysis and extended it to hold
that there was no governmental obligation to provide Medicaid funding
even for certain medically necessary abortions. 47 Maher and McRae
were decided over vigorous dissents.' 48
140. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
141. Colautti struck down a state statute requiring higher standards of physician care in
performing abortions when the fetus might be viable because it did not state explicitly that
when there is a conflict between maternal and fetal health, the mother's health always must
prevail. Id. at 398-401.
142. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Maher
and Harris have provided the analytic framework for many of the Court's subsequent abortion
and public funding decisions, including Rust. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772-73.
143. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), a companion case to
Maher, the Court held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988), did
not obligate the expenditure of Medicaid funding for abortions that are not medically neces-
sary. Beal, 432 U.S. at 447.
144. Abortions that are not medically necessary to the health of the mother often are re-
ferred to as "nontherapeutic." See, eg., Beal, 432 U.S. at 440-45 (describing the abortions for
which petitioners sought Medicaid funding as "nontherapeutic" and "unnecessary-though
perhaps desirable-medical services").
145. Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-80. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The petitioners in Maher asserted that Connecticut's different treatment of
abortion and childbirth violated the latter provision. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470. In analyzing the
constitutionality of a government funding decision, the Court held it need be shown only that
the restrictions are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id at 477-78. The
rational-relationship test is the basic analysis applied in an equal protection or due process
analysis; this test has been analogized to a presumption of constitutionality. TRIBE, supra note
70, § 16-2, at 1439-43. By contrast, so-called "strict scrutiny" analysis is applied when a stat-
ute is challenged as infringing a fundamental right or distinguishing between persons in its
application based on some suspect classification, such as race. Id § 16-3, at 1451-52. To
survive strict scrutiny, a statute must be shown to be justified by a substantial governmental
interest; few statutes that impair fundamental rights survive such a challenge. Id § 16-3, at
1452-53 & n.4.
146. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
147. Id. at 313-18.
148. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented in Maher, in McRae they were
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In Maher a six-Justice majority held that, to be valid, any statute
which "'operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Consti-
tution'" must survive strict judicial scrutiny. 149 Poverty alone did not
define a suspect class,' 50 declared the majority, and furthermore, the
rights the Court had defined in Roe were not fundamental in nature.151
The constitutional right declared in Roe, according to the Maher Court,
was not per se a "right to abortion," but rather the right to be free from
"unduly burdensome interference" with the choice between abortion and
childbirth.'52 For these reasons, the majority observed, a strict-scrutiny
analysis was not necessary in Maher. The Court instead employed a ra-
tional relationship test and upheld the statute. 53
Justice Marshall voiced an impassioned dissent, condemning the
Court's decision as a "vicious attack" '54 on Roe v. Wade 55 and as "legal
legerdemain" producing what would be a de facto total ban on abortions
joined by Justice Stevens. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 329-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 337-
48 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 348-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Maher, 432 U.S. at 482-
90 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Beal, 432 U.S. at 454-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 462-63
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973)). Strict judicial scrutiny requires a showing of a compelling state interest in the regula-
tion, such as would outweigh the rights that are infringed. See TRIBE, supra note 70, § 16-7, at
1454.
150. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471 ("[Tlhis Court has never held that financial need alone identi-
fies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis." (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
29)). For discussions and arguments on both sides of the question whether there are constitu-
tional rights to public support to enable the indigent to exercise fundamental rights, see, e.g.,
Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 695, 697-98 (finding no support for such rights in constitutional text, history, or struc-
ture); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23-48 (1987) (arguing for a constitutional right to minimum in-
come); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.
L.Q. 659, 659-60 (arguing that such rights can be found in the Constitution).
151. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471-73. The Maher Court explained that it had used a strict
scrutiny analysis in Roe because of the extreme nature of the statutory prohibition, not because
of the fundamental nature of the right. Id
152. Id at 473-74. Any burden on the indigent woman's choice, according to the Maher
majority, was not the result of the statute, but rather of the woman's indigency, a situation
existing wholly apart from the statute and unaffected by it. Id. at 474.
153. See id at 474-81. The Court also drew a distinction between statutory provisions that
directly interfere with constitutionally protected activity and those that encourage one such
activity, but not another. Id. at 475 & n.9 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-97 (1976)).
The Court declared: "Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose
its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public
interest is necessarily far broader." Id at 476.
154. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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for the poor.156 The Court's use of an "outdated and intellectually disin-
genuous 'two-tier' equal protection analysis," said Justice Marshall, al-
lowed it to perpetrate its sleight-of-hand, and to set up a two-tiered
system of abortion rights: one for the wealthy and one for the poor. 157
Similarly, the five-to-four decision in Harris v. McRae,158 authored
by Justice Stewart, stated that the Roe decision had emphasized strongly
a woman's interest in protecting her health, but rejected the claim that
because the federal statute denied funding for medically necessary abor-
tions it infringed on indigent women's privacy rights under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.' 59  Again the Court distinguished between direct
governmental action to impose its will, which it said was impermissible,
and the government's choice to encourage one activity and not another,
which was found acceptable."6 The Court declared that "it simply does
not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitu-
tional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices." '61
Dissenting again in McRae, Justice Marshall pointedly analyzed the
probable effects of the federal government's refusal to fund medically
necessary abortions on indigent women, concluding that these may in-
clude considerable health damage and as many as one hundred addi-
tional deaths per year. 62 He stated, as he had in Maher, that the
majority's opinion effectively denied poor women the rights to abortion
that had been declared available to all women in Roe.'63 Justice Bren-
156. Beal, 432 U.S. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 457-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall urged his own sliding-scale
equal protection analysis in which the importance of the benefits denied, the character of the
affected class, and the state's interests would be balanced carefully in every situation, with the
resulting "level" of scrutiny varying from case to case. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Under this analysis, he noted, the challenged funding restrictions would fail. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
158. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
159. IdL at 315-17.
160. Id. at 315.
161. Id at 316. The opinion emphasized the majority's view that the statute in question
did not cause or affect indigent women's range of choices, which the Court claimed remained
the same as they would have been absent the existence of Medicaid benefits generally. Id. at
316-17.
162. Id. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. Id at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Maher, Justices Marshall and Blackmun had
joined Justice Brennan's dissent, which analyzed the effects of the Medicaid funding restric-
tions on indigent women's rights to choose abortion. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482-85
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found that poor women's fundamental rights
were inhibited unduly by the statutorily imposed "financial pressures.., to bear children they
would not otherwise have." Id. at 484-85, 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He further noted that
the funding restriction should have been balanced against a compelling state interest as it
represented an undue burden on a fundamental right. Id. at 484-85, 488-89 (Brennan, J.,
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nan, writing a joint dissent in McRae, chastised the Court for once again
failing to recognize that it is the combination of the pregnant woman's
poverty and the government's funding decision that effectively prohibits
her freedom of choice.'
Justice Stevens, explaining his decision to join the dissenters in Mc-
Rae, 161 criticized the McRae majority for not properly recognizing wo-
men's rights to prefer their health to fetal life, and reminded the majority
that Roe had held state action interfering with that right unconstitu-
tional. 166 He analyzed McRae as an example of an unconstitutional spe-
cial exception from a governmental benefit.1 67  If Congress creates a
benefit for a particular class of people, he stated, it has no right to with-
hold the benefit from members of that class just because they choose to
exercise a constitutional right. 168
Ten years after McRae, the Court extended its abortion funding
doctrine in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,1 69 allowing restric-
tions on the use of public facilities and personnel to provide abortions
when the mother's health or life was not in danger.1 71 Chief Justice
Relmquist, writing for the majority,17 1 upheld a Missouri statute that
prohibited the use of public funds, facilities, or personnel to perform or
assist in the performance of nontherapeutic abortions. 7 2 Noting that the
dissenting). Justice Marshall also filed a separate dissent accompanying Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977), that applied to Maher as well. Beal, 432 U.S. at 454-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Maher, 432 U.S. at 481. In that opinion, Justice Marshall's similarly emphasized the effects of
the Court's decision. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 456-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out the
effects on poor women and children of upholding the Medicaid restrictions, and decrying
"[tihe Court's insensitivity to the human dimension of [its] decisions [in Beal and Maher]").
164. McRae, 448 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined in the dissent. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was in the Maher majority.
Maher, 432 U.S. at 465.
166. McRae, 448 U.S. at 351, 352 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He thus distinguished Mc-
Rae from Maher, in which the federal government had chosen not to fund only nontherapeutic
abortion. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 478-80.
167. McRae, 448 U.S. at 349 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
168. Id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
169. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
170. Id. at 511.
171. Id. at 496. On the issue of the constitutionality of prohibiting the use of public funds,
facilities, and personnel for performing abortions, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority
of the Court, which included Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. Notably,
two sections of the Rehnquist opinion were supported by only Justices White and Kennedy.
Id Had these two sections of the opinion received support from a majority of the Court, the
Roe trimester framework would have been abandoned. Id. at 517-21.
172. See id. at 501-04. Three other portions of the statute had been challenged in the lower
court. These provisions prohibited: (1) the use of public funding for counseling on nonthera-
peutic abortion; (2) physicians who were public employees from engaging in abortion counsel-
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Due Process Clause does not create an affirmative right to public subsi-
dies, even to ensure fundamental rights, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited
Maher and McRae for the proposition that equal protection analysis of
public funding restrictions requires only the rational-relationship test.173
Because Maher already had held that state restrictions on public funding
met the rational-relationship test, the Chief Justice said "it [would]
strain[ ] logic to reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities and
employees." '174 The Court concluded that poor women were not denied
completely the choice about whether to end a pregnancy, because ,they
were free to seek an abortion at private hospitals and clinics. 175 Webster
thus completed the trilogy of Court decisions about public funding for
abortions, limiting indirect subsidization of indigent women's abortions
by allowing state prohibition on the use of public facilities for abortion.
THE ABORTION COUNSELING DECISIONS
Although the Court had no occasion to rule in Webster on a statu-
tory prohibition of abortion counseling by public employees at public fa-
cilities, the Court had visited the question of permissible governmental
controls on such speech six years earlier in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc. 76 In that case, abortion providers in Ak-
ron, Ohio challenged a city ordinance which, in part, specified details of
the physician-patient conversation that would be compelled as part of
obtaining written informed consent for an abortion. 17 7 By a vote of six to
ing; and (3) the provision of such counseling in public facilities. Id. at 502-03. The lower
courts had enjoined implementation of all three of the provisions, and the state chose to appeal
only the injunction of the first provision, on the use of funding. Id. Because no appeal was
made on the other two statutory restrictions, the Court did not reach those issues in Webster.
Id. at 504. Although the majority limited itself to consideration of the issues represented by
the statute, Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion indicated his interest in overturning Roe. Id.
at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 507-11.
174. Id. at 509-10. The Court held that there is " 'no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual."' Id. at 507 (quoting DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). The Court found that no strict
scrutiny of limitations on funding was required; rather only a showing of a rational relation-
ship to "the legitimate governmental goal of encouraging childbirth" was sufficient. Id. at 508-
09 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-23 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470-
71, 473-74 & n.8 (1977)).
175. Id. at 509.
176. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
177. Id. at 442; see also id. at 423-24 n.5 (setting out the language of the ordinance's in-
formed consent provisions). In addition to this provision, which is most relevant to the issues
raised in Rust, the ordinance challenged in Akron included: (1) requirements that all abortions
after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; (2) a requirement that the
consent of one parent or a judicial authorization be obtained for abortions performed on mi-
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three, the Court held the provision unconstitutional. 178
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell distinguished Akron's in-
formed consent ordinance from the informed consent statute the Court
had upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 1 9 The Danforth statute
required only that a woman give informed written consent to an abortion
procedure; it did not attempt to define or stipulate the parameters of the
health care provider-patient consultation required for "informed con-
sent." ' The Akron majority held that the state's interest in informed
consent did not give a state "unreviewable authority to decide what in-
formation a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abor-
tion." ' Furthermore, Justice Powell observed, the state interest did not
justify regulations designed to influence the woman's decision.182 The
Akron ordinance exceeded the city's authority, according to Justice Pow-
ell, both because it required health care providers to recite a specific "lit-
any of information" to their abortion-seeking patients and because its
underlying purpose was to sway those patients away from abortion.183 A
footnote to the opinion also stated that appropriate counseling must be
individualized, varying considerably from patient to patient, in order to
satisfy each patient's needs. 8
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
White, 8 5 noted that the Court previously had upheld abortion-related
informed consent regulations that were indistinguishable from the Akron
regulations in terms of their counseling requirements.18 6 In a footnote,
nors under 15 years of age; (3) a prohibition on the performance of an abortion until 24 hours
after the woman had signed a written consent; and (4) a requirement that fetal remains be
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner. Id. at 421-24. All the provisions were held
unconstitutional. Id. at 426.
178. d at 443-46, 452.
179. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
180. Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-43. Justice Powell carefully noted that the Court continued to
believe that consultation between patients and their health care providers is critical to the
abortion decision. Id at 447-48.
181. Id at 443. Implicit in this discussion is the use of the rational-relationship test to
evaluate the statute. The Court noted that the state's interest in ensuring that patients make
an informed choice "will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's...
choice between abortion or childbirth." Id. at 443-44.
182. Id at 444. In an accompanying footnote, the majority noted that the legislation up-
held in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), which
asserted a state interest in pregnancy rather than abortion, was valid "only because it did not
add any 'restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.'" Akron, 462 U.S. at
444 n.33 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
183. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45.
184. Id. at 448 n.38.
185. Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 471 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 400 n.l,
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Justice O'Connor hypothesized that informed consent regulations might
be found to "violate the First Amendment rights of the physician if the
State requires him or her to communicate its ideology." ' 7 Justice
O'Connor further noted that the Court had not discussed this possible
implication of the regulations because the respondent Akron Health
Center had not raised a First Amendment claim in the lower courts."8 '
,Three years later, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 1 9 the Court revisited the issue of the state's ability
to regulate the dialogue preceding a patient's informed consent. In
Thornburgh a five-to-four majority invalidated a Pennsylvania statute
stipulating the particulars of the physician-patient conversation and re-
quiring the physician to provide specific printed material to each pa-
tient.190 The Court declared the printed material "nothing less than an
outright attempt to wedge [Pennsylvania's] message discouraging abor-
tion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue." 191 It held that
the Pennsylvania statute in question was invalid for the same two reasons
as the Akron ordinance: it was designed to persuade patients not to have
abortions, and it attempted to define too inflexibly the specifics of the
physician-patient dialogue. 192
Interestingly, the Thornburgh opinion pointed to a statutory provi-
sion mandating the use of a prescribed agency list in patient consulta-
tions as an example of an unacceptably persuasive state technique. 193
The Court held that because the list was required to include certain
412 (1980) (upholding a Utah statute requiring that the patient be informed about adoption,
fetal development, and foreseeable risks of the abortion operation)).
187. Id. at 472 n.16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705,
717 (1977), described infra note 223).
188. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
190. Id. at 760-61. The majority noted that "[a] requirement that the woman give what is
truly a voluntary and informed consent, as a general proposition, is, of course, proper and is
surely not unconstitutional. But the State may not require the delivery of information
designed 'to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth.'" Id. at
760 (citations omitted) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-44, and citing Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976)).
191. Id. at 762.
192. Id. at 762-63. Thornburgh, like Akron was decided not on First Amendment grounds,
but under the theory that state interference in the physician-patient dialogue impermissibly
interfered with the patients' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to abortion.
See id. at 761-63, 771-72.
193. Id. at 762-63. The statute required that the printed material include a statement to
the effect that many public and private agencies existed to help if the patient chose to carry the
pregnancy to term, and that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urged the patient to
contact them before making her abortion decision. Id. at 761 (quoting Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3208(a)(1) (1983), amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 3208(a)(1) (Supp. 1991)).
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health care providers that might be "out of step with the needs of the
particular woman," it represented an impermissible interference with the
physician's responsibility and with the physician-patient dialogue.194
RUST'S SIGNIFICANCE TO ABORTION LAW
On its face the Court's opinion in Rust breaks little new doctrinal
ground, either in the abortion field generally, or in the specific context of
public funding. In its previous decisions in Maher v. Roe, 195 Harris v.
McRae,196 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,197 the Court set
out and solidified its view that indigent pregnant women have no right to
public funding to facilitate their exercise of reproductive rights as defined
in Roe v. Wade.198 In addition, the court consistently had held that legis-
lative decisions withholding public funding of abortions are not subject to
strict scrutiny. 199 Without doctrinal support for a strict-scrutiny analysis
of the Title X regulations, the outcome of the Rust decision is not sur-
prising.2"° In all of the previous funding cases, however, the Court had
performed some level of balancing the state's interest in the challenged
statutes against the rights they infringed.2 1' In Rust there was no such
balancing test employed. The Court relied only on its previous decisions,
without further analysis, to hold that the government's choice to fund
childbirth but not abortion presents no impermissible obstacle in the path
of an indigent woman's rights.2"2 By simply declaring that no rights are
infringed, the Court in Rust claimed that there was no need to analyze
the permissibility of an infringement.
While Rust thereby avoided a direct assault on the fundamental con-
cept-embodied in Roe and all subsequent abortion cases-that maternal
health always must be of paramount concern in state efforts to regulate
abortion, it raises concerns about the erosion of the law in this area.
194. Id. at 763.
195. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
196. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
197. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
198. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 112-75 for a discussion of the
rights set out in Roe and their qualification in subsequent Court decisions.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 142-68 for a discussion of the analysis employed in
this line of cases.
200. The Court relied on Webster, Maher, and McRae for its holding that "Congress' re-
fusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same
choices as if the government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all." Rust, 111
S. Ct. at 1777-78.
201. See, eg., Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-11 (analyzing the rational relationship between the
state's interest and the rights it infringed); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980)
(same); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-77 (1977) (same).
202. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776-77.
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Over a contrary reading by the Solicitor General, the Court construed
sections of the Title X regulations to allow referral for abortion when a
woman's pregnancy "places her life in imminent peril.""2 3 The Court
did not, however, express a view as to whether the regulations banned
abortion referral in the event of a less imminent, but equally serious
threat to maternal health.2 4 This foreshadows a significant change from
the Court's earlier abortion decisions, which consistently held that seri-
ous health risks to the mother are of primary concern in the abortion
context.
205
203. Id. at 1773. But see 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1991). Read together, §§ 59.8(a)(2)-(4) and
(b)(1) on their face suggest that a Title X health care provider would be prohibited from coun-
seling or referring a client for an abortion, at any point in her pregnancy, even when the
mother's health is jeopardized. See id §§ 59.8(a)(2)-(4), (b)(1). This restriction directly con-
travenes the Court's holdings in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), each of which states the paramount importance of the
woman's health during the first trimester of her pregnancy. See supra notes 112-27, 141, and
accompanying texts. The majority construed these regulations to preclude this effect, but the
Solicitor General's interpretation, in his brief and at oral argument, was not so generous. See
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773; id at 1786 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The official transcript
reported a series of questions from Justices Stevens, Souter, and Scalia to Solicitor General
Kenneth W. Starr on the issue of abortion counseling and referral when a patient's health is
threatened, including this dialogue between Justice Scalia and the Solicitor General:
QUESTION: ... Assuming it is not an immediate emergency but a [health]
concern about 30 days from now, could the doctor say I just happened to notice this,
I think you ought to have your tonsils taken out?...
MR. STARR: Yes. I think that the physician can in fact alert the individual
to a potential medical problem.
QUESTION: And suggest the proper solution, in his or her judgment?
MR. STARR: I think at that point the physician may very well be going be-
yond what Title X is all about....
QUESTION: . . .Do you think the [regulations] would prohibit the doctor
from giving medical advice that is not specifically authorized by the statute or con-
templated within the notion of family planning? ....
MR. STARR: I disagree with that....
... I think it will violate the terms of the grant, because the grant is... funding
this physician to provide Title X services.
Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-47, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392); see also Brief
for Respondent at 7 n.5, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392) (noting that the regulations would
allow abortion referral in emergency situations, but not stipulating that abortion referral is
required during the first trimester of pregnancy if the mother's health is jeopardized).
204. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
205. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (allowing
the prohibition of the use of public facilities for performing abortions unless necessary to save
maternal life); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (allowing restriction on the use of
direct federal subsidies for abortion, except when the mother's life would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term).
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In upholding the regulations challenged in Rust, the Court also
modified the law relating to the physician-patient dialogue in the abor-
tion context. Invoking Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists20 6 and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,2 °7 the Rust majority effectively held for the first time that women
are not entitled to receive the full range of information about their
choices when faced with a pregnancy.2 °0 The majority distinguished the
counseling requirements struck down in Akron and Thornburgh from the
Title X regulations, noting that the former were overbroad, reaching all
women and all physicians engaging in the abortion dialogue, rather than
only that category of women whose poverty compels them to patronize
federally funded clinics.2 °9 Because Title X patients have not theoreti-
cally lost their right to abortion-related information from other sources,
reasoned the majority, the Title X regulations were saved from the fate
that befell the Thornburgh and Akron statutes.210 The Court made no
attempt to assess the actual effect of the counseling requirements, which
arguably could leave the pregnant members of Title X's target population
with the mistaken impression that there is no other choice available to
them but to carry their pregnancies to term.211
The potential effects of the new rules demonstrate the flaw in the
Court's assumption that Title X patients are left with the same range of
choices as they would have had in the absence of the federal program.
First, the low probability that the low-income areas in which Title X
clinics are located can support both a publicly funded (Title X) clinic and
a private clinic means that if there is a Title X clinic in existence, it likely
will dominate the market. Under this analysis, once a Title X clinic is
established it probably will be the only available health care "choice" for
the women in the area.212 Establishing a Title X clinic therefore affects
the available health care choices of low-income women. It follows that
206. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
207. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
208. Akron and Thornburgh held that only minimal state interference in the abortion coun-
seling context was permissible. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
209. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
210. Id. The majority ignored the fact that, unlike the Rust challenge, the statutes in Ak-
ron and Thornburgh were not challenged on First Amendment grounds. The Court also ig-
nored Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron distinguishing the Akron statute from statutory
requirements on a physician to communicate the state's views on abortion, which she said
might be unacceptable on First Amendment grounds. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Title
X client will construe the limited counseling as advice to forgo her right to abortion); Chervin,
supra note 12, at 403 (describing the need to analyze the effects of the regulations).
212. Indeed, one study of family planning clinics throughout the United States found that
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prohibiting abortion counseling at the clinic directly affects the availabil-
ity of that information; women will be forced to wait longer and travel
further to learn about their options.213 This effect is likely to be height-
ened in areas that are both low-income and primarily rural. Second, the
Court's analysis ignores the fact that some Title X patients are required
to pay part of the clinic fee, receiving only a partial subsidy from Title X.
Absent other information, such patients will base their choice to pay the
fee on the assumption that they will not need to go elsewhere for addi-
tional information. If a Title X patient can afford a private clinic fee in
the first instance, she will be unlikely to choose a subsidized clinic; this is
even more true for patients who can afford a private clinic fee plus the
additional cost of the Title X fee.
THE FiRsT AMENDMENT AND R UsT
Unlike previous Court decisions concerning abortion counseling, in
which challenges to the statutory or regulatory requirements were
brought exclusively under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Rust
present a clear First Amendment challenge.214 The plaintiffs raised two
kinds of First Amendment issues.2"' They claimed first that the abortion
counseling ban constituted a content-based restriction on the speech be-
tween health care providers and their patients.216 In addition they
claimed that such restrictions could not be justified merely because the
counseling speech was federally funded.21 7 In order to understand the
Court's response to these questions, one must understand the First
Amendment's general proscription of government controls on speech
based on its content. In addition, it is also important to understand the
extent to which government funding of a program has been held to in-
crease governmental authority to regulate speech.
often these facilities are the only source of health care in an area. Donovan, supra note 12, at
198.
213. Elimination of Medicaid funding for abortion affected low-income women's abortions
in that way: Medicaid-eligible women had abortions later in their pregnancies when public
funding was no longer available than they had when it was available; they also travelled fur-
ther to have the procedure. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff
and Abortion Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 179 (1984).
214. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1768-78; see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 758-72 (1986) (discussing the constitutionality of the statutes
exclusively in the context of their effects on abortion rights); Akron, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "it does not appear that [the petitioner] raised any First
Amendment argument in the court below").
215. See supra notes 20, 29-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of plaintiff's First
Amendment challenges.
216. Brief for Petitioners at 13-39, Rust (No. 89-1391).
217. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
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The First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" '218 has long been
held a fundamental right for purposes of due process or equal protection
review, as it is included explicitly in the text of the Bill of Rights.219 It
comprises not only the right to express ideas, but to receive ideas ex-
pressed by others.220 One accepted tenet of modem First Amendment
jurisprudence is that, with certain very limited exceptions, the "govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter or its content. ' 22 1 The Court has recognized that con-
tent-based regulation may be permissible in limited circumstances in or-
der to give effect to an important state objective.222 When assessing the
constitutionality of a speech regulation that is content-based, the Court
has traditionally applied strict scrutiny analysis, asking first whether
218. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
219. See TRIBE, supra note 70, §§ 11-1, 11-2 & 16-9, at 770-73, 1458-60.
220. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Ex-
pression, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1854, 1863 (1983) (noting that the First Amendment's aim is to
allow a person to realize his individual identity through the process of giving and receiving
ideas and images) (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482)).
221. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1969); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). Mosley concerned picketing activity on a public
sidewalk adjacent to a public high school. Id. at 93. The Court struck down a local ordinance,
enacted to prohibit all picketing except peaceful labor picketing within 150 feet of the school,
finding it a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it unfairly discriminated between
types of picketing speech. Id. at 95-102.
222. Note, supra note 220, at 1854; see also Paul B. Stephan II, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Rnv. 203, 205, 214-31 (1982) (noting that the Court has
limited its absolute rule that government action must be content neutral by upholding regula-
tions and statutes forbidding political advertising on public buses, land use controls on adult
theaters, and radio broadcast of sexually explicit speech). Some members of the Court have
characterized sexually explicit speech and commercial speech as appropriately regulated on
the basis of their subject matter. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 317-18 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court also has recog-
nized that regulations based not on the speech's content, but only on the time, place, and
manner in which it is expressed are permissible, if they are " 'narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and... leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see Mosley, 408
U.S. at 98.
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there is a "compelling state interest" in the regulation, and, second,
whether the statute is "narrowly drawn" to achieve that purpose, or
whether there is a less restrictive alternative formulation that could
achieve the state's goal.22
3
Some Supreme Court decisions have drawn a distinction between
"content-based" regulation, including controls based on the subject mat-
ter of speech, and "viewpoint-based regulation," which includes controls
based on the opinions expressed by the speaker, rather than on the kind
of speech in which she is engaging.224 Other cases do not make this dis-
tinction, however, and the Court cannot be said to have either embraced
or rejected it.22 Both content- and viewpoint-based regulations have
triggered the familiar two-part analysis.226
The Court also has decided a line of cases concerning governmental
authority to regulate speech through its funding decisions.22 7 It held
223. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). In Boos the Court invalidated a portion of a Dis-
trict of Columbia ordinance that banned the display of signs expressing opinions against a
foreign country's policies within 500 feet of that country's embassy. The restriction was held
unconstitutional because it was based only on the signs' content, and because there was a
content-neutral approach available to reach the government's objective of keeping the peace
and not offending the foreign government; namely, the government could have prohibited all
picketing of any kind. Id. at 327. Another portion of the ordinance, banning any congregation
within 500 feet of an embassy, was upheld because it was not content-based. IA. at 329; see
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977) (striking down a statute requiring all
drivers of noncommercial vehicles in New Hampshire to carry on their license plates the
state's motto "Live Free Or Die," which was counter to petitioners' religious viewpoint). The
Wooley Court noted that "'even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."' Id at 716-
17 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted)). Interestingly,
New Hampshire's case was briefed in part by then-state Attorney General, and later Supreme
Court Justice, David Souter. Id at 706. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Free
Speech Because of Its ContenL" The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L.
REv. 81, 82 & n.6 (1978) (noting that the Court has not articulated a precise method for
testing the constitutionality of content-based speech restrictions, but that it has used variations
of the compelling-interest strict-scrutiny analysis).
224. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811-12 (1985);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion).
225. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (using the terms
content-based and viewpoint-based interchangeably to refer to impermissible regulations
prohibiting editorializing by radio stations receiving federal grant support).
226. Id. at 380-81. The Court noted that "'[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-
based regulation extends not only to restriction on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibi-
tion of public discussion of an entire topic."' Id. at 384 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
227. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987)
(finding unconstitutional a state tax scheme imposing sales tax on certain magazines but not
others); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-401 (rejecting federal regulations prohibit-
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unanimously in Regan v. Taxation with Representation228 that the gov-
ernment has authority to fund one type of speech over another 22 9-for
example, to subsidize counseling or other private speech, but not legisla-
tive lobbying. In addition, the Regan majority noted that it was not nec-
essary to engage in strict judicial scrutiny of statutes which make such
funding distinctions. This, the Court declared, was because such statutes
do not discriminate on the basis of the content of speech or the viewpoint
expressed.23 °
In Regan, as in the Court's previous decisions, content- and view-
point-based discrimination in federal subsidies was prohibited.231 The
Court made it clear that Congress may not, in making its funding deci-
sions, "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to
'"aim[ ] at the suppression of dangerous ideas." '"232 In Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland233 the Court noted that this prohibition ex-
tends to attempts to suppress " 'public discussion of an entire topic.' ",234
In the context of one of the abortion funding cases, the Court invali-
dated, on substantive due process grounds, a state statute that included
specific statements required of health care providers in counseling their
patients.235 While the Court's analysis was based on the patients' Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to abortion rather than First Amend-
ment grounds, the Court emphasized the constitutional importance of
the dialogue between health care providers and their patients that leads
ing editorializing by publicly funded radio and television stations); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that denial of tenure to a professor at a public college on the
basis of his outspoken criticism of the college's administration would be unconstitutional).
228. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
229. 11 at 545-46 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). Regan
upheld a section of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (1988), allowing an
income tax deduction for private contributions to nonprofit organizations that do not engage in
lobbying, but not extending the deduction to private contributions to nonprofit entities that do
lobby. Id at 546-48.
230. Id at 548-50.
231. Id. This is true for direct subsidies, such as grants to radio stations, League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-401, and for indirect governmental subsidies such as tax exemptions
for certain kinds of speech but not others, Arkansas Writers'Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 231-32.
232. Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))) (alteration by Regan Court).
233. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
234. Id. at 230 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537 (1980), and citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383-84; Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1981) (plurality opinion); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6
(1980)).
235. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
760-64 (1986); see supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Thorn-
burgh decision.
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to the patients' informed consent to medical treatment.23 6 Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, said "the State may not require the deliv-
ery of information designed 'to influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth.' "237
The Rust Court's analysis represents a significant departure from
prior First Amendment cases involving publicly funded speech. The
Rust Court's reliance on Regan 23 to support its view that the regulations
were not impermissibly content-based was misplaced. Regan involved a
governmental decision not to fund one category of speech-lobbying by
nonprofit organizations-not a decision to distinguish between particular
statements within a speech category on the basis of their content.239 In
Rust, however, the majority declared that funding speech about child-
birth but not about abortion was analogous to the congressional decision
not to fund all nonprofit lobbying upheld in Regan.
Furthermore, the Rust majority declared that the challenged regula-
tions were not viewpoint- or content-based, but merely a governmental
choice to fund one activity over another.2' The language of the abortion
counseling regulations themselves do not support this holding, however,
as they require that specific information be given to a pregnant Title X
patient concerning prenatal care to protect her health and the health of
the fetus, but prohibit any counseling on or referral for abortions.241 In
addition, they contain direct references to the government's goal of re-
ducing the incidence of abortion.242 Moreover, the fact that the regula-
tions are content-based was admitted by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in his brief to the Court.2 4 3
Because the regulations are in actuality content-based, the Rust
236. Thornbutgh, 476 U.S. at 761-63.
237. Id. at 760 (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 443-
44 (1983)). In an earlier case, Justice O'Connor suggested that regulations having such an
effect would violate the First Amendment. Akron, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); see supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
238. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
239. Id. at 548.
240. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771-76. This analysis assumes that the "activity" that the
government has chosen to fund is not in itself viewpoint discriminatory, an assumption which
is flawed in this context, id., as even the Secretary admitted in his brief, see infra note 243 and
accompanying text.
241. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1991).
242. Section 59.2 states that "[flamily planning... should reduce the incidence of abor-
tion." Id. § 59.2.
243. Brief for Respondent at 23 n.21, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392). In this footnote, the
Secretary asserted that the regulations "prohibit all discussion of abortion 'pro or con,'" to
support his statement that the regulations are not viewpoint-based, but rather only content-
based. Id. The brief further stated that "[elven if the regulations did impose a viewpoint
restriction, the analysis would be much the same. The government is entitled to have a view-
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Court should have subjected them to a traditional two-part analysis re-
quiring a compelling state interest and regulations narrowly drawn to
further that interest. Under such an analysis, however, the regulations
seemingly would fail. The government's stated interest in this case is in
implementing its "value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion." 2'
The Court has previously said that interest was not compelling enough to
support direct restrictions on the content of private speech between a
patient and her physician. 45 Even if that interest was sufficiently com-
pelling, content-based regulations would have to be narrowly tailored to
serve it under the traditional strict-scrutiny analysis. A set of regulations
defining the contours of family planning counseling could narrowly serve
a governmental purpose to favor childbirth over abortion only by being
flagrantly coercive, offering the Title X patient no opportunity to hear
about her choices beyond the government's preferred option. This, the
Rust majority claimed, the regulations did not do. Why then did the
Rust Court uphold regulations that had these effects? Was it simply be-
cause federal funding was involved?246
Indeed, the Court did rely on the fact that it was a government
funded program that defined the speech rights involved here.247 The ma-
jority framed the issue as a demand for a government subsidy, then dis-
missed it on the basis that there is no governmental duty to subsidize all
fundamental rights.2 48 According to the Court: "we have here not the
case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of
speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund . ..
speech."249 It then categorized the counseling speech involved as
point when it participates in public discourse." Id. The Secretary provided no supporting
citation for this statement. Id.
244. Id
245. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
760-63 (1986). In Thornburgh the Court noted that "the State may not require the delivery of
information designed 'to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or child-
birth."' Id at 760 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 443-44 (1983)).
246. Professor Sunstein has suggested that the Court's willingness to make this kind of
distinction stems from its reliance on the outmoded doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 602-04. This anachronistic model, according to Sunstein, is based on
the idea that the normal state of affairs is no governmental intervention; such analysis ignores
the presence and effects of the modern administrative state. Id. at 595, 603 (presenting the
Court's decision in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), as an illustration of the problem).
Professor Sunstein recommended that the Court should recognize the doctrine's flaws and
replace it with a straightforward analysis weighing governmental purposes against rights in-
fringed, even when the government action is a funding decision. Id. at 620-21.
247. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1172-73.




"outside the scope of the project."25 From the Court's perspective then,
the fact that the Title X program involved a financial subsidy of private
counseling speech gave the government power to control the content of
that speech without any constitutional limitations."' Although the
Court noted that public funding would not "invariably" justify govern-
ment control over the content of expression, it limited the examples of
situations in which government control would not be sufficient. 25 2 These
included public speech on public property or other areas "'expressly
dedicated to speech activity,' "25 and in a university setting. 25 4 The
Court declined to resolve the question whether the health care provider-
patient relationship was so "fundamental to the functioning of our soci-
ety" that it too should be specially protected, as are conversations in a
university context.2 5
This conception of the speech rights in question was fundamentally
flawed, because it failed to c6nsider fully the Title X patients' rights to
receive full information in the context of the government subsidy which
they receive through Title X. This resulted in an inadequate analysis by
the Court of whether the regulations represent an unconstitutional condi-
tion on the receipt of a public benefit.2 6 The Rust majority analyzed the
counseling regulations as though they affected only the Title X project
and its staff, but not the indigent clients.25 7 This reasoning was sup-
ported by the Court's notion that the "doctor-patient relationship estab-
lished by the Title X program [is not] sufficiently all-encompassing so as
to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive med-
ical advice."25 8 Title X patients' First Amendment right to receive com-
250. Id.
251. Id at 1772-73. The Court noted: "Within far broader limits than petitioners are
willing to concede, when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program." Id at 1173.
252. Id at 1776.
253. Id (quoting U.S. v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990)).
254. Id.
255. Id
256. In this sense, the Court's unconstitutional conditions analysis is doubly flawed: first,
because the Court utilized the doctrine at all, supra note 246 (reporting one commentator's
view that the doctrine is anachronistic and therefore not useful), and second, because the
Court failed to analyze the subsidy received by Title X patients.
257. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771-76. The Court characterized the benefits of Title X fund-
ing as accruing to the Title X project and to its employees.
258. Id. at 1776. This assertion runs directly counter to the legislative history of the pro-
gram: it was created to provide to its target population a system of comprehensive, quality
health care to which they would otherwise not have access. Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, Rust
(No. 89-1391). The Rust Court's analysis suggests that if the Title X program could be said to
create an expectation or entitlement to a comprehensive doctor-patient relationship, the Court
might have found that the abortion counseling ban deprived Title X patients of some due
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plete information therefore was not merely ignored by the Court, they
implicitly were held not to exist.2" 9 Similarly, the Court failed to recog-
nize the fact that the Title X program is a subsidy to the patient and that
the benefit she receives is conditioned on her unknowing surrender of her
right to full information. Viewed this way, the counseling regulations fail
as an unconstitutional condition on a government benefit, whether or not
the information is available elsewhere.260
In addition, the Rust majority's analysis of health care providers'
speech rights is questionable. Because the regulations in question require
speech about one alternative while prohibiting speech about another,
they obviously intrude on physicians' and health care workers' ethical
and legal obligations to give pregnant Title X patients information about
all of their medical choices.261 Rust thus represents a result which the
Court previously said it would never reach:262 the government grants
benefits only to Title X clinics and patients that effectively give up their
fundamental rights to free speech, and in the case of Title X physicians,
expose themselves to liability for malpractice.263
process property right. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 597-99 (suggesting that under one view
of an unconstitutional conditions analysis, traceable to Justice Holmes, the government's abil-
ity to impose conditions on its funding decisions is constrained only when there is some pre-
existing entitlement in the program).
259. Because the patient has no expectation of receiving full advice, by the Court's logic
she is held not to have lost anything if she is not provided with information. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at
1776-77.
260. See, eg., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), for the proposition that even when there is no right to a benefit, the
government may not require the tender of a fundamental right as consideration for receiving
it).
261. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun J., dissenting). The duty of physicians and other
health care workers to disclose full information to their patients in order to provide patients
the opportunity to make an informed choice about their treatment is found in the common-law
doctrine of informed consent. Brief of Twenty-two Biomedical Ethicists as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 13-16, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392); see also Brief for Petitioners at B-
1 to B-3, Rust (No. 89-1391) (listing the 31 jurisdictions in which physicians have been held
liable for failure to disclose all information relevant to the patient's exercise of an informed
choice about medical treatment).
262. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) ("The case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m]
at the suppression of dangerous ideas!.... [Here] [w]e find no indication that the statute was
intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect." (quoting
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
263. In 30 states and the District of Columbia, physicians have been held liable for failing
to disclose full information relevant to a patient's informed choice about medical care. Brief
for Petitioners at B-1 to B-3, Rust (No. 89-1391). All health care providers at Title X clinics
must be under the supervision of a physician. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)(6) (1991).
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CONCLUSIONS
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more prop-
erly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy,
than a woman's decision ... whether to end her pregnancy. A
woman's right to make [the abortion] choice freely is funda-
mental. Any other result... would protect inadequately a cen-
tral part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally
to all.2
Justice Powell wrote these words in 1986 in Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.2 65  The Rust Court, however,
reached out2 66 to define indigent women's right to choose abortion in
different terms than those used by Justice Powell. The Court recognized
that the abortion counseling ban will complicate Title X patients' deci-
sions to seek abortions, and upheld it, without close analysis, on the basis
that these women will be no worse off than if Title X did not exist.267
This fundamental assumption-that Title X clients have not really
lost anything under the regulations, because they had nothing to lose to
begin with-is the heart of Rust's problems. The Court ignored the fact
that by creating the Title X program, the government immediately affects
all of its potential users, who now have access to services they otherwise
264. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986).
265. Id.
266. The previous, long-standing Title X regulatory framework did not raise constitutional
issues, and allowed all nondirective pregnancy and abortion counseling. The majority's deci-
sion to ignore the traditional doctrine of statutory construction and their subsequent decision
to reach out to decide the constitutional questions in Rust evince the Court's new brand of
judicial activism. This aspect of Rust may produce positive results, insofar as the decision may
cause Congress to be clearer in its future statutory drafting. Rust has already inspired two bills
clarifying the language of Title X to permit nondirective abortion counseling by Title X health
care providers. S. 323, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (passing the full Senate on July 17, 1991);
H.R. 392, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (not considered by the full House as of time of this
Note's publication); Telephone Interview with Paul Feldman, Legislative Director in the office
of Rep. David Price, (D-N.C.) (Oct. 22, 1991). The language of the bills was appended to the
1992 Appropriations Act for Health and Human Services, and approved by both houses, but
did not withstand a Presidential veto and an override attempt. H.R. 2707, the House Appro-
priations Bill for Labor and Health and Human Services contained a provision prohibiting the
appropriation of any federal money to the enforcement of the Title X regulations. The bill
passed both houses of Congress, and was reported out of conference committee in late October,
1991. Telephone Interview with Kimberly Reynolds, Legislative Assistant to Sen. Terry San-
ford (D-N.C.) for Labor and Human Resources (Oct. 22, 1991). President Bush vetoed the bill
in November, 1991, and an override attempt in the House of Representatives fell short by
fourteen votes. 137 CONG. REc. H10,491, H10,507-08 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991). On March
20, 1992, the Health and Human Services Department issued guidelines for implementing the
gag rules which lift the abortion-counseling ban from clinic doctors, but not for other health
are providers at Title X clinics. See Hilts, supra note 7, at 1.
267. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
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could not afford. For that reason, the assumption that they are no worse
off under the regulations assumes that they will choose not to use the
program, not that they will use it and unwittingly give up their First
Amendment rights in the process. In so holding, the Court looked at the
law and the Title X patient's experience from the perspective of a finan-
cially privileged person. Such a person will never have to be burdened
with the need to make an uninformed choice between the two finite and
discrete options represented by abortion and childbirth, and can afford to
make the decision to opt out of the Title X program in any event. Title
X family planning counseling was developed to serve indigent or finan-
cially strapped women. Title X projects often require such women to pay
a nominal fee for the services they receive through the program; often the
fee is as much as they can afford. 6 Having expended their resources to
gain access to the project's staff, these women effectively have no choice
but to take the information proffered by the project as their only source
of medical information. Framing the question in terms of their opportu-
nities to seek information elsewhere thus misses the point.
Pregnant women who are Title X patients have no real choice to
seek information elsewhere for two reasons. First, the biological fact of
their pregnancy and the trimester framework established in Roe v.
Wadez6 9 means that they will have only a limited amount of time in
which to seek a low-risk, affordable, and legal abortion. Second, many
Title X clients have no financial resources to seek the information else-
where.2"' Furthermore, given the requirement that the Title X provider
keep silent about abortion but speak about prenatal care, nothing in the
Title X framework alerts these women that other information exists for
them to seek. At that point, which is imminently reachable in the Title
X context, the government's action through its Title X program takes the
form of a state-coerced promotion of one alternative over another.
Rust also foreshadows a more broadly applicable change in the
Court's abortion jurisprudence, by signalling that the law no longer holds
a pregnant woman's health of paramount concern in the abortion deci-
sion. The Rust Court is not straightforward in this holding, however.
Instead, the Court disingenuously interprets the language of the regula-
268. See Donovan, supra note 12, at 198, 201-02; Brief of Twenty-two Biomedical Ethicists
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21-22, Rust (Nos. 89-1391 & 89-1392); see also Brief
for Petitioners at 3, Rust (No. 89-1391) (noting that in addition to Title X and other public
monies, clinics receive private funding from grants and patient fees).
269. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); see supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
270. In fact, a recent study suggested that many low-income women no longer can afford
even Title X clinics, which are having to increase their fees to make up for reduced federal
program funding, higher medical costs, and greater patient health care needs. Donovan, supra
note 12, at 201-02.
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tion to hold that Title X health care providers may counsel and refer for
abortion when the mother's life is in danger, while not providing such an
interpretation to support counseling and referral when maternal health is
at stake. While seeming to stretch to preserve Roe rights, then, the Rust
majority actively narrows them.
The potential implications of Rust in the First Amendment area are
also far-reaching. Rust deals not with content-based regulation of margi-
nal speech (such as commercial speech or pornography),271 but with pri-
vate, confidential speech between a health care provider and her patient
when any portion of that speech is subsidized publicly. In addition, the
Rust Court held that government regulations restricting the content of
funded speech are not subject to any degree of judicial scrutiny. Rust,
therefore, affects kinds of speech that traditionally have enjoyed para-
mount protection, including discussions of "important social issues," and
speech that implicates both First Amendment rights to the free exchange
of ideas and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy.272 Fed-
eral grants for the arts and for libraries are but two of the public subsi-
dies that could be affected by the Rust decision's loosened standards for
analysis of governmental restrictions on subsidized speech. In addition,
Rust allows governmental intrusion into any professional-client dialogue
that is funded publicly, even those that traditionally have been consid-
ered privileged. Examples beyond Rust's doctor-patient context might
include discussions between a social worker or a public defender and his
clients.273
When will Rust be used in the future? A challenge to regulations
including content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on expression that is
even partially publicly funded, after Rust, will require no analysis of the
271. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318-21 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (char-
acterizing sexually explicit speech and commercial advertising as distinguishable from other
more meritorious speech but not as worthy of censorship).
272. Even in the cases dealing with the limited First Amendment protection afforded com-
mercial speech, the Court has noted that "where ... a speaker desires to convey truthful
information relevant to important social issues such as family planning... the First Amend-
ment interest served by such speech [is] paramount." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-01 (1977);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)). In Bolger the Court noted that the activity in
question-the advertisement of contraceptives-was especially protected, because it included
elements both of the right to free exchange of information and ideas, and the right to privacy
and autonomy in personal decision making. Id. (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 700-01).
273. One could imagine regulations limiting the advice that a social worker might provide
to her clients about sources of additional public funds, or limiting a federal public defender's
ability to seek for his guilty drug dealer client sentencing options that are against the gover-
ment's preference for strict sentencing for such offenders. Following the Court's analysis,
however, this result of Rust might be limited when an entitlement to the publicly provided
consultation could be shown.
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government's interest at all. This result will be due to the majority's
reasoning that such regulations do not deny completely the opportunity
to express particular views, but only relegate them to a completely un-
subsidized arena.2 74 The Rust Court explicitly recognized only two ex-
ceptions to its view that public funding is sufficient to justify
governmental controls over the content of speech: publicly funded
speech that occurs in traditionally public places and in universities.275 In
all but these exceptional publicly funded contexts, the net result of Rust
might be that free expression and the exchange of ideas are reduced from
a right to a private privilege-those who have the financial wherewithal
will enjoy full First Amendment "rights," and those without will enjoy
free access only to the government's views.2 76
If the Court's decision in Rust could be characterized as limited to
the context of abortion counseling or lobbying, or federally funded abor-
tion-related activity, it would be merely another chapter in the story of
the Court's present attempts to limit pregnant women's rights to choose
among medical alternatives. Rust's importance is far broader, however.
It suggests that the government has almost unreviewable authority to
control the content of protected speech through federal funding. In addi-
tion, Rust is a strong statement about the limited nature of the personal
rights held by those without power and wealth who are dependent on the
administrative state in late twentieth-century America.
ANN BREWSTER WEEKS
274. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
275. Id. at 1776.
276. Professor Catharine MacKinnon has made this argument in the context of federal
funding for abortion. She noted that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), and its successor
cases, particularly Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980), granted women "abortion as a
private privilege, not as a public right," and that "women with [financial] privileges get
rights." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 100-01 (1987). These ideas
about abortion are further developed in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 184-95 (1989).
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